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Lea Brilmayer* & Raechel Anglin**
ABSTRACT: This Article provides a novel account for the choice of law
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s and, building on our new
conceptualization of the choice of law revolution, this Article argues for a
fundamental shift in modern choice of law-a shift toward a multifactor
future.
Whereas previous scholars have uniformly conceived of the transition from
the dominant first Restatement of Conflict of Laws to modern choice of law
theory as a legal realist rejection of vested rights, this Article argues that
judges were motivated to move away from the first Restatement because they
found inequitable its single-factor results. The first Restatement relies on a
single contact with a state to determine which state's law applies in a
multistate dispute, and this Article concludes that when that contact
"stands alone"-i.e., is the only contact with that state-judges find the
result dictated by the first Restatement to be arbitrary and unjust. When
faced with such "lopsided "factual scenarios, judges have moved away from
the first Restatement.
However, because judges and scholars alike have consistently misdiagnosed
the underlying problem, as this Article demonstrates, modern choice of law
theories suffer from the same single-factor flaws that plague the first
Restatement. Thus, this Article argues for a multifactor approach to choice
of law. This Article argues that a multifactor approach will have three
significant advantages: (1) avoidance of controversial jurisprudential
premises; (2) reduction of extraterritoriality; and (3) greater flexibility for
judges. Perhaps most importantly, by properly identifying the root cause of
the first Restatement's ills, this Article paves the way for greater theoretical
clarity and simplicity, leading to more equitable results in choice of law.
* Howard Holtzmann Professor of International Law, Yale Law School.
** Associate, Bingham McCutchen LLP. She would like to thankJudge Charles R. Wilson
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CHOICE OF LA W THEORY
I. INTRODUCTION
Choice of law is an essential concern in any case involving occurrences
in more than one jurisdiction, and American courts are increasingly hearing
cases involving choice of law concerns. Before a judge can decide how to
apply the law to the facts of a case, the judge must decide which law to apply.
Since the laws of different jurisdictions are often directly in conflict, choice
of law often determines whether the plaintiff or the defendant wins the case.
Choice of law is a critical component of American jurisprudence, intensely
practical yet theoretically complex.
We identify one pervasive error in the way that courts ordinarily
conceptualize choice of law. This error is the common assumption that
judges can determine the correct choice of law by identifying one particular,
theoretically exceptional contact that, even when standing alone, dominates
the choice of law process and dictates the result.
Consider, as illustration, the following hypothetical problem. A North
Carolina clothing manufacturer and a New York retailer negotiate a contract
in the course of meetings at the seller's home office in North Carolina. The
contract legally comes into being when the buyer accepts the offer at the
seller's office in North Carolina and is expressly made subject to North
Carolina law. North Carolina is the place where the plaintiff alleges the
breach took place. Which law applies, and why?
The conventional wisdom is that this question requires a choice
between different connecting factors ("contacts"). Courts have typically
framed the choice of law question as follows: Should the applicable law be
the law of the place of contracting, the law chosen by the parties, the law of
the place of performance, or the law of the state where the buyer (or seller)
resides? Traditional theory, embodied in the "vested rights" approach of the
first Restatement of Conflict of Laws, framed the answer in terms of
particular territorial occurrences (e.g., where the contract was formed); in
contrast, modern theory, illustrated by governmental interest analysis,
focuses on the parties' domiciles. Both approaches, however, implicitly
assume that there is a single, inherently significant contact-what we call the
"trigger"-that, standing alone, is sufficient to support applying the chosen
state's law. In both theories, the reasoning revolves around the chosen
factor's supposedly special jurisprudential character: Under traditional
theory, the "last act" gives rise to a "vested right," while under modem
theory, one party's domicile gives a state an "interest" in having its laws
applied.
Entirely overlooked is the overall pattern of contacts between the
dispute and the states involved. The "single factor" way of understanding the
hypothetical posed above disregards the fact that five factors point toward
North Carolina (the domicile of the seller, the location of the negotiations,
the location of the acceptance, the choice of law reflected in the contract,
and the location of the breach) while only one factor (the domicile of the
1127
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95 IOWA LA WREVIEW
buyer) points toward New York. The dispute's "center of gravity" as a whole
is assigned no importance at all; multifactor methods are hardly even
considered. 1
Despite the conventional wisdom, we doubt that there are many cases in
which choice of law can be reduced to a single, intrinsically dispositive
contact.2 The answer to choice of law problems cannot be found by
theorizing about which connecting factors are inherently the most
important because the applicable law is a function of the overall fact pattern
a particular case presents and not of any particular contact standing alone.
The sterile character of much contemporary choice of law debate is a direct
result of the fact that conventional choice of law approaches are searching
for something that does not exist-a single, inherently determinative
contact that, standing alone, is sufficient to justify the application of local
law.
Our argument begins with a review of the traditional first Restatement
territorial vested rights approach and surveys the reasons why it was
eventually found unsatisfactory. 3 We argue that the standard account of how
traditional thinking was discredited overlooks the theory's single most
important defect: The first Restatement was unable to handle cases in which
the designated trigger was the only contact supporting application of the
chosen law. 4 This defect is a direct consequence of the first Restatement's
single-factor structure, which treats choice of law as basically a question
about the choice among connecting factors. 5 Modern interest-based
theories, however, turn out to make similar single-factor assumptions and
are therefore similarly vulnerable.6
A third system, the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, mixes
conceptual elements taken from both of these theories. It is possible to
interpret the Restatement (Second) as a "multifactor" theory, thus avoiding
the pitfalls of both vested rights and interest-based theories, but so far most
academics have not done this.7 We conclude by recommending further
1. For a discussion of the abortive center-of-gravity approach that the New York courts
applied around the midpoint of the twentieth century, see infra notes 210-14 and
accompanying text.
2. See infra note 266 and accompanying text (providing possible exceptions).
3. See infra notes 9-25 and accompanying text (reviewing the early development of the
first Restatement approach).
4. See infra Part IL.B (discussing stand-alone trigger cases).
5. See infra notes 29-57 and accompanying text (discussing the conventional account of
the choice of law revolution).
6. See infra notes 154-57, 191-208 and accompanying text (discussing modern
approaches to choice of law).
7. See infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text (discussing these approaches to the
Restatement (Second)).
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CHOICE OF LA W THEORY
examination of alternative multifactor approaches to choice of law, such as
weighing or balancing.8
II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO CHOICE OF
LAW: THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT
The last one hundred years have seen tremendous change in the
assumptions underlying choice of law. For about the first third of the
twentieth century, the traditional vested rights theory was the dominant
approach. Several decades of legal realist inspired critique followed this
period, before the gradual adoption of modern approaches. Legal historians
refer to the transition from traditional to modern theories as the "choice of
law revolution."9
The conventional explanation for the choice of law revolution
attributes the transition exclusively to the defects in the traditional vested
rights approach. This explanation overlooks, however, one striking feature
of the transition that led to the abandonment of traditional choice of law
theory: Most cases rejecting traditional methods involved scenarios where
the supposedly applicable law was supported by a single, stand-alone contact.
It is not so much that judges came to appreciate that the first Restatement's
designated connecting factors were the wrong ones; rather, judges simply
became increasingly unwilling to apply the law of a state with only a single
contact with the dispute.
A. THE FIRST RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OFLAWS
The first Restatement is the earliest choice of law approach that
American courts still apply. 10 The object of its vested rights approach was to
designate when and where the cause of action came into being. 11 Vesting
coincided with the occurrence of the "last act" necessary to create the cause
of action-for example, the location of the car crash in a tort suit. The
location of this final occurrence thus determined the applicable law.
8. See infra notes 252-93 and accompanying text (describing the benefits of these
approaches).
9. For general discussions of the first Restatement approach to choice of law, see
generally Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989), and Perry
Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness, "and Choice of Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1191 (1987).
10. The work ofJoseph Story preceded the first Restatement, and the vested rights theory
borrowed in certain ways from ideas in Story's earlier work, JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONFLIcT OF LAwS (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1834). Story's approach, founded on the
concept of "comity," has had considerably less influence on American choice of law, and we do
not address it below for this reason. See Terry Kogan, Toward aJurisprudence of Choice of Law: The
Priority of Fairness over Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 658 n.32 (1987) (describing the "territorial
approach" reflected in the first Restatement). Even the critics of the first Restatement
acknowledge its importance. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWs 182 (3d ed. 2002).
11. See infra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing vested rights).
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Professor Joseph Beale of Harvard Law School, the chief author of the
first Restatement, was motivated by a grand ambition typical of an earlier
generation of scholars-the scientific systematization of an entire field of
law. 12 He sought to bring all existing conflicts case law under a single
theoretical umbrella. His vision of the meaning and importance of
territoriality was central to the development of the traditional approach. For
Beale, states did not enforce other states' laws directly, but rather recognized
the rights created under other states' laws.13 The substantive legal rights that
courts are charged with enforcing, Beale argued, vested at a particular time
and place. 14 Choice of law required the identification and application of the
law under which the rights vested because without rights having vested
under a particular law, no substantive legal rights existed, and there was
nothing for other states to enforce.15
Beale explained the matter in his treatise, published one year after the
first Restatement:
The law annexes to the event a certain consequence, namely, the
creation of a legal right.... When a right has been created by law,
this right itself becomes a fact .... [T]he existing right should
everywhere be recognized; since to do so is merely to recognize the
existence of a fact.16
From Beale's premise that rights vest at a particular time and in a
particular place, it followed logically that a single, unique spatiotemporal
occurrence marked the right's creation. We refer to this uniquely defined
occurrence as the "trigger."
The first Restatement identified different triggers for different
substantive areas of law (for example, tort, contract, or family law) and in
some of these legal areas, different substantive sub-rules required different
triggers as well. 17 Within a particular rule or sub-rule, however, only a single
act in a single place might trigger the vesting of a legal right. In contract
cases, for instance, the trigger was the final event necessary to cement the
12. See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960, at 14 (2001)
(discussing Beale's attempt to "systematize the entire field of conflict of laws").
13. See infra text accompanying note 16 (explaining Beale's vision).
14. See Dane, supra note 9, at 1194-95 (recounting Beale's argument).
15. Id.
16. 3JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1969 (1935).
17. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-378 (1934) ("The place of
wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort
takes place, [and t]he law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a
legal injury."); id. § 332 ("The law of the place of contracting determines the validity and effect
of a promise with respect to capacity ... to make the contract.. . ."); id. § 255 ("Capacity to
make a valid conveyance of an interest in a chattel is determined by the law of the state where
the chattel is at the time of the conveyance.").
1130 [20101
HeinOnline -- 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1130 2009-2010
I REVIEW ]
s r le IVard l, i f t r e
t t, i ated i l lier
tion f rs-the tific tization f
t i g ting licts r l
tical l . ing t ce
rit riality r l l ent itional . r
, i r e r tes' t r ized
t r ' ! i l i ts t
ts l , ticular e
. 14 ire i ation lication
i ted e t i t d
r tic lar ti e l ,
t ing t r states to enforce. 15
is ed
s i , ,
l t ...
s ... ti t
re i ; ize
f a fact. 16
ise ti lar








eral y , : (
' fla .
. i fr t t i t ( l i i l ' i i ).
. ne, ra t , t - (r ti l ' r t).
. [ .
. J . , I I ws ( ).
. e, . ., ( I ) I ws - ( 4) ( l
i i t t t t l t t t t li l ll t t
t l , [ t l t l t i t
l l i j . ; i . l t l t ti t i t li it t
i t . t ..."); id. t
li i t r t i tt l i t r i t l t t t r
is t t t . ).
s o a
t e t t i r
r l i t r l
n l i
l an
t r o t a




r h s e
e u t
















CHOICE OF LA W THEORY
parties' contractual entitlements and responsibilities-the acceptance. 18
Thus, the first Restatement directed the judge to apply the law of the "place
of contracting," typically "the place ... where the delivery [of the
acceptance] is made."19 In tort cases, the supposed last act-"the state where
the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes
place" 20 -was assumed to be the place of the injury.21 A well-known early
case illustrates the basic idea. Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll
dealt with a choice between the laws of Mississippi, which had a fellow-
servant rule, and Alabama, which did not.22 An injured brakeman, who
resided in Alabama, had been working for an Alabama-incorporated railroad
company; the employment contract had been signed in Alabama as well.
23
The injury occurred in the course of a trip originating in Alabama and
crossing into Mississippi, with the negligent failure to inspect the braking
equipment occurring in the former state and the injury occurring in the
latter.24 Noting that there had been no cause of action while the train was
still in Alabama, the court applied the law of Mississippi, where the injury
occurred.25 Generations of law students have studied this case as an example
of the first Restatement's elevation of conceptual reasoning over common
sense. Common sense directs that the court should have applied Alabama
law, given that all factors-except for the trigger factor-pointed to
Alabama.
B. THE CHOICE OFLA wREvOLUTION
Around the middle of the twentieth century, doubts about the first
Restatement's solution reached a critical point; certain states stopped
applying it and started to look for better answers.26 The conventional
explanation for this choice of law revolution focuses on the defects of the
traditional approach. Scholars focused their criticism on the territorial
connecting factors, arguing that reliance on territorial factors is arbitrary
18. Id. § 312.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 377.
21. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (detailing triggers in the first Restatement).
Other Restatement rules governed numerous other substantive areas of law. See RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS § 121 (requiring application of the law of the place where the
marriage was celebrated); id. § 208 (requiring application of the law of the property's location).
22. Ala. Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 804 (Ala. 1892). This case did not apply
the first Restatement-it was decided several decades earlier. However, its reasoning was
symptomatic of the body of law thatJoseph Beale sought to "restate."
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 809.
26. California and New York led the search for a superior choice of law approach. See infra
notes 98-110.
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and leads to fortuitous results. 27 They argued that the "last act" test, in
particular, corresponded to nothing of genuine relevance to the choice of
law process.28 In practice, judges faced with applying the first Restatement's
rules lacked the flexibility to avoid irrational outcomes and were forced to
rely on "escape devices" to avoid absurd results. When the system of
loopholes and exceptions collapsed under its own weight, bellwether states
like California and New York took their first steps toward modern "interest
analysis."
1. The Conventional Account
The first Restatement's logic was difficult to credit. The theory
designates the "last act" as its preferred single-factor trigger because the "last
act" coincides with the vesting of a cause of action. 29 Of course, in doing so,
the first Restatement ignores the numerous other factors that contribute
equally to the cause of action. In a tort case, for example, the first
Restatement ignores the parties' domiciles and the location of all of their
other interactions, even though these parties and their other interactions
may be just as necessary for the creation of a legal right as the final event-
the injury. In contract cases, the first Restatement generally rendered the
location of negotiations and performance irrelevant; everything turned on
where the acceptance was delivered. 30
Two leading authorities, Richman and Reynolds, offer the following
hypothetical example of the first Restatement's application to a contract
dispute:
Suppose a contract is negotiated in Connecticut for the delivery of
goods in Connecticut by a Connecticut seller to a Connecticut
buyer. Although Connecticut is the only state with a real interest in
the transaction; if the parties had concluded their negotiation at a
27. See, e.g., Ernest G. Lorenzen & Raymond J. Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 587 (1935). The authors query:
Why should the legal relations between residents of the different states of this
country arising out of interstate transactions be determined by such an accidental
consideration as that of where the last act occurred which would be necessary to
make a transaction contractually binding ... or by the rules of some state
arbitrarily selected? Should not interests arising out of interstate contractual
transactions be controlled by economic and social objectives rather than technical
and arbitrary rules relating to the place where, if at all, the alleged contract is
deemed to have been made?
Id.
28. Id.
29. Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J, 883, 891 (2002)
("Rights were considered to have vested in the jurisdiction where the last act necessary to
complete the cause of action occurred.").
30. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (explaining the trigger for the creation
of a contract right).
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CHOICE OF LAW THEORY
trade convention in Florida, the Restatement would apply the law
of Florida to the contract. Surely that is a triumph of form over
substance.3 1
They construct a similar hypothetical from the first Restatement's rules for
torts:
Consider an automobile accident between two Californians,
plaintiff and defendant, which occurs about two miles south of the
border between California and Mexico. Suppose that plaintiff is
seriously injured-about $200,000 worth. Further suppose that
Mexico, desiring not to impoverish tortfeasors, has established a
negligence damage limitation of $6,000 but that California does
not limit damages because it favors full compensation for tort
victims. According to the Restatement, the law of Mexico should
apply because Mexico is the place of injury.32
Richman and Reynolds designed these hypotheticals to demonstrate the
irrationality of the first Restatement's vested rights approach. Only the last
act is given any weight, even when its location is entirely arbitrary; the choice
of law analysis considers all other events irrelevant.
Faced with such arbitrary results, judges began to resist the first
Restatement. The resistance took two forms-manipulation to avoid
irrational results on a case-by-case basis ("escape devices") and
abandonment of the traditional approach entirely (the choice of law
revolution). 33 Scholars have traditionally explained this resistance as both a
response to the first Restatement's rigidity and a consequence of legal
realism disavowing the underlying legal theory of vested rights. 34
a. Escape Devices
A frequent critique launched against the first Restatement was that it
forced judges to resort to subterfuge and manipulation to avoid irrational
results. 35 As a general matter, the first Restatement denies judges the
flexibility necessary to reconsider outcomes that seem illogical or
counterproductive. The vested rights approach conceptualizes choice of law
as an objective, predetermined rule of decision.36 Judges are not tasked with
31. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 202.
32. Id. (footnote omitted).
33. See infra notes 35-57 and accompanying text (discussing the ways that judges avoided
the first Restatement's arbitrary results).
34. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (categorizing the first Restatement
approach as objective and inflexible).
35. See RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 164 (discussing judges manipulating the
choice of law decision to avoid arbitrary results).
36. See Dane, supra note 9, at 1194-96 (noting that the law of the place where the specified
events occurred governed choice of law decisions almost exclusively).
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choosing the appropriate law for a particular dispute and are allowed no
latitude for a holistic evaluation of the underlying facts. 37 Neither is there
room to consider the legislature's policy objectives in adopting the
particular substantive law in question.38 The vested rights approach, one
might say, removes judgment from a judge's determination of the
appropriate law.
Lacking the authority to reconsider arbitrary outcomes, judges resorted
to evasion. The subterfuges that they employed became known as "escape
devices" because judges took advantage of competing rules within the
Restatement system to "escape" results they did not wish to reach. 39 Judges
employed several types of escape devices. 40
Perhaps the handiest escape device was "characterization"-where a
case that seemed to be one sort of dispute might on closer examination be
"reconceptualized" as a different type of dispute. 41 For example, in Carroll,
the injured brakeman attempted to recharacterize his cause of action as a
contract rather than a tort case.42 If successful, the plaintiff would have been
entitled to application of the place-of-contract, rather than the place-of-
injury, rule. 43 Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the judge retained the tort
characterization and applied the law of the place where the accident
occurred. 44
Characterization provided other litigants better luck. Levy v. Daniels' U-
Drive Auto Renting Co., for example, involved an automobile accident that
occurred in Massachusetts. 45 Under the first Restatement, Massachusetts law
would have applied to cases sounding in tort.46 The Connecticut court chose
instead to characterize the case as a contract case. 47 This characterization
resulted in application of Connecticut's vicarious-liability rule which allowed
the passenger's suit to proceed against the rental agency and not only the
driver.
Equally possible was the conversion of a tort case into a dispute
regarding marital status. In Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., the
defendant, the plaintiff's former husband, injured the plaintiff by his
37. Id.
38. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 202.
39. See generally R. LEA BRILMAYER & JACK L. GOLDsMITH, CONFLICT OF LAws: CASES AND
MATERIALs 114-72 (5th ed. 2002) (discussing the escape devices of characterization, renvoi, the
substantive-procedural distinction, and public policy).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 114.
42. Ala. Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 807 (Ala. 1892).
43. Id. at 807-08.
44. Id. at 809.
45. Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163, 163 (Conn. 1928).
46. Id. at 164.
47. Id. at 164-65.
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CHOICE OF LAW THEORY
negligent driving in California.48 California had an interspousal-immunity
rule; Wisconsin did not.49 The Wisconsin Supreme Court characterized the
issue as a problem of marital status.50 The court's characterization resulted
in application of Wisconsin's law of marital domicile, rather than
California's tort law.
Just as a tort case was turned into a contract dispute (or a contract
dispute transformed into a tort case), a substantive rule was, likewise,
characterized as procedural, and therefore governed by the law of the
forum. Grant v. McAuliffe, for instance, arose out of a two-car collision in
Arizona.51 Under Arizona law, the claim did not survive the defendant's
death, but there was no such bar to suit in California, the forum.52 Justice
Traynor reasoned that the relevant issue-survival of the action after the
death of the tortfeasor-was properly considered procedural and not
substantive and rejected the Arizona law defense. 53
Where characterization did not preclude illogical results, judges turned
to stronger medicine: the infamous public policy exception. 54 Under this
escape device, a court might refuse to apply another state's law if that law's
substantive content was profoundly objectionable. 55 Sometimes judges
combined the public policy exception with characterization to avoid
application of a disfavored law. In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
Massachusetts was the location of the plane crash and, consequently, the
place of injury.56 Thus, under the first Restatement, Massachusetts law would
have been applicable as the location where the cause of action vested. The
New York Court of Appeals refused, however, to apply the Massachusetts
Wrongful Death Act, which capped recovery at $15,000 on two grounds: (1)
the issue should be governed by forum law because it was procedural
(characterization) and (2) the limitation was contrary to New York's public
policy.
57
48. Haumschild v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814, 814 (Wis. 1959).
49. Id. at 815.
50. Id. at 817-18.
51. Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944, 946 (Cal. 1953) (en banc).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 949.
54. See, e.g., Marchlik v. Coronet Ins. Co., 239 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ill. 1968) ("Public policy of
Illinois precludes the use of our courts as the forum for cases under the Wisconsin direct action
statutes and application of the exclusionary rule does not violate the full-faith-and-credit
provisions of the Federal constitution.").
55. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICr OF LAws § 612 (1934) ("No action can be
maintained upon a cause of action created in another state the enforcement of which is
contrary to the strong public policy of the forum.").
56. Kilberg v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 526 (N.Y. 1961); see also Harold L. Korn,
The Choice-ofLaw Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772, 823-25 (1983) (discussing the
facts and outcome of Kilherg).
57. Kilberg, 172 N.E.2d at 529.
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b. Transition Cases: The Choice of Law Revolution
No theory requiring such a complex system of loopholes and exceptions
was likely to last for long. The opportunities for evasion that these loopholes
offered not only discredited the first Restatement's theoretical
underpinnings, but also undercut its practical aspirations of predictability
and uniformity. Rather than being applauded for providing flexibility, the
myriad exceptions to the rigid rules may actually have hastened the first
Restatement's downfall.
Once courts began to contemplate the possibility of abandoning the
first Restatement, the choice of law revolution was underway. Many
important transition cases rejecting the first Restatement justified their
rejections on the grounds that the trigger factor was "fortuitous"58 or some
similar pejorative-"adventitious," "arbitrary," or "happenstance."59 By
58. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text (discussing the connection between
fortuity and stand-alone triggers).
59. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699, 703 (Alaska 1968) (referring to the parties'
contact with Canada as "fortuitous, transitory, and insubstantial"); First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek,
514 P.2d 314, 317 (Colo. 1973) ("harsh, unjust results"); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13,
19 (Conn. 1986) ("The virtue of simplicity [, as embodied in the lex loci delicti rule,] must.., be
balanced against the vice of arbitrary and inflexible application of a rigid rule."); Bishop v. Fla.
Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 1980) ("happenstance"); DeMeyer v. Maxwell,
647 P.2d 783, 786 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) ("Considering that they both lived in Idaho, where this
trip originated, and that only through fortuitous circumstances were they passing through
Oregon at the time of the accident, we cannot infer that either of them had any expectation
that the Oregon guest statute would apply."); Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593, 596 (III. 1970)
("The arbitrary nature of the doctrine is quite evident in this case where determination of the
applicable law is based upon what spot in the Mississippi River the decedent met his death.");
Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ind. 1987) ("The place of the tort is
insignificant to this suit."); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1968) ("The presence
of the parties in Wisconsin at the time of the accident was entirely fortuitous."); Wessling v.
Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky. 1967) ("By fortuitous circumstances the accident happened on
the other side of the Ohio River instead of on this side."); Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610,
613 (Me. 1970) (referring to lex loci delicti as the "arbitrary stereotyped course"); Mitchell v.
Craft, 211 So. 2d 509, 513 (Miss. 1968) ("Louisiana's sole relationship with the occurrence is
the purely adventitious circumstance that the collision happened there."); Phillips v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 2000 MT 55, 1 35, 298 Mont. 438, 35, 995 P.2d 1002, 35 ("The Restatement
approach is preferable, in our view, to the traditional lex loci rule which applies the law of the
place of the accident which may be fortuitous in tort actions."); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d
279, 284 (N.Y. 1963) ("adventitious"); Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (N.Y. 1954)
("fortuitous"); Issendorfv. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 755 (N.D. 1972) ("The locus of the accident
was fortuitous.... ."); Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917, 923 (R.I. 1968) ("All the interest
factors, other than the fortuitous locus of the accident, point to the application of Rhode Island
law."); Chambers v. Dakotah Charter, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 63, 68 (S.D. 1992) ("It was merely
fortuitous that Charlotte slipped while the bus was passing through Missouri."); Hataway v.
McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 60 (Tenn. 1992) ("We think the fact that the injury occurred in
Arkansas was merely a fortuitous circumstance, and that the State of Arkansas has no interest in
applying its laws to this dispute between Tennessee residents."); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d
312, 317 (Tex. 1979) (explaining that the place-of-injury rule is "often arbitrary and unjust");
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408, 416 (Wis. 1965) (describing the place of accident-
Nebraska-as "fortuitous").
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CHOICE OF LAW THEORY
referring to "transition cases," we mean only those cases on the cutting edge
in which courts of some particular state first made the shift away from the
first Restatement. The first state to entertain the possibility of rejecting the
vested rights theory was New York6 0-its experience is instructive.
The earliest New York transition case was Auten v. Auten: a dispute
regarding the enforcement of an alimony and child-support agreement. 61
An English woman brought the case against her husband who had deserted
her and moved to New York.62 She followed him there, and the two entered
into a separation agreement. 63 The wife then immediately returned to
England and sued for divorce the following year.64 Thirteen years later, she
brought suit in New York for the arrears.65 Her former husband defended
on the ground that her filing for divorce in England violated the separation
agreement and forfeited any right to payments under it.66 This defense was
legally inadequate under English law but would have been recognized in
New York. 67 However, the New York court dismissed the connection with
New York-the place where the parties signed the agreement-as "entirely
fortuitous" and allowed the case to proceed. 68 Thus, Auten demonstrates an
early rejection of the first Restatement because the New York court relied on
a "grouping of contacts" theory, rather than allowing a single-factor trigger
to determine the applicable choice of law.69
In the 1963 case of Babcock v. Jackson, similarly, the New York Court of
Appeals dismissed the defendant's argument that, as the place of injury,
Ontario's law should apply. 70 The court of appeals based its decision on the
grounds that the place of injury was merely "adventitious."7 1 A vehicle
registered, garaged, and insured in New York, carrying only New York
domiciliaries, had set off on a weekend trip to Ontario. 72 The accident
occurred while the group was in Ontario, and when the group brought the
suit in New York, the critical objection was the Ontario guest statute. 73 The
60. See infra notes 61-76 and accompanying text (illustrating the New York cases Auten,
124 N.E.2d 99, and Babcock, 191 N.E.2d 279).





66. Auten, 124 N.E.2d at 101.
67. See id. (noting that under New York law, "plaintiffs commencement of the English
action and the award of temporary alimony constituted a rescission and repudiation of the
separation agreement, requiring dismissal of the complaint").
68. Id. at 102.
69. Id. at 101-02.
70. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284-85 (N.Y. 1963).




HeinOnline -- 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1137 2009-2010
I
i i
i i t r
i t t t t.
60 its ce
li t ti
i t f r t f an ali ony and child-support agreement.61
t t
r t r .62 f ll i t , t t




t t ts .66




rl r j ti t fir t t t t t
r i f t t t r , t t ll i i l f ctor r
t a lica le choice of law.69
t . n, , t
ls is iss t f t' t t t, t l i j ,
i 's .7o t
r s t t t l i j r l entitious."71 i l
re istere , ara e , i s r i r , rr ing l r
i ili ri s, t i ,?2 i ent
rred il t i t i , t
s it i e r , t riti l j tion t t ri t t t t . 73
. i f t ing
. . , , . . ).






. See i . ( ti t t r r l , l i tiff's e ent t lish
acti t r f t r r li tit ted r i i i ti
se aration a ree e t, r iri is issal f t l int").
[ .
[ -
. a c c .Jac s , . . , - ( . . ).























g d g g d a e e k
t i t d
r r t e
u e c ca s s
ee r s - t t (ill tr ti t s t ,
124 2d 99 and abcock 191 2d 279





. t , . . t
67 id no ng ha unde e o k a "p a n ' co enc of he ng
on and he a a d o e po a y a ony cons u a esc ss on and repud a on f t e
p g n , equ ng d o he co p a .
68. d. at .
69. [d. at 101- 02.
70. B b o k v. k on, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 85 . . 1963 .
71. d. at 284.
. [ .
. .
95 IOWA LA WREVIEW
New York court refused to apply Ontario's guest statute, favoring the law of
the parties' common domicile. 74 The judge reasoned:
The present action involves injuries sustained by a New York guest
as the result of the negligence of a New York host in the operation
of an automobile, garaged, licensed and undoubtedly insured in
New York, in the course of a week-end journey which began and
was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole relationship with
the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the
accident occurred there. 75
Babcock v. Jackson has been called the "watershed decision that at last
moved the modern choice of law revolution out of the academic journals
and into the courts. ' 76 It is an excellent example of the methods and
objectives of the choice of law revolution, as conventionally interpreted
because the court focused on the grouping of contacts rather than
traditional law's single-trigger factor.
2. What the Conventional Account Omits
The conventional account of the choice of law revolution attributes the
first Restatement's demise to its theoretical deficiencies, specifically to its
theoretical underpinnings in the vested rights theory. Importantly, the
conventional account concludes that the arbitrary nature of these cases
stems from the fact that, in accordance with vested rights theory, the
selected trigger is a territorial factor. 77 Scholars assumed that identifying a
different single-trigger factor-such as the parties' domicile-would lead to
better results. 78 Scholars did not question the wisdom of selecting a single-
trigger factor, only whether a territorial last act should fill that role.79
Closer examination, however, reveals that the nature of the trigger
factor-the territorial last act-was not the problem. The results dictated by
the first Restatement were arbitrary not because of the nature of the single
trigger, but rather because they relied on a single, stand-alone trigger.80 The
most important common characteristic animating the academic
hypotheticals, application of escape devices, and transition cases that
discredited the first Restatement's approach is that in almost all of them the
74. Id. at 285.
75. Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 284.
76. Korn, supra note 56, at 827.
77. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (describing Beale's theory that a right
vested in a particular place); supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (noting the criticism of
the traditional approach).
78. See Lorenzen & Heilman, supra note 27, at 587 (questioning the arbitrary selection of
the territorial-last-act standard).
79. See id. (suggesting economic or social triggers instead of a territorial one).
80. See infra Part II.B.2.a (describing the problem with the stand-alone trigger).
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CHOICE OF LA W THEORY
Restatement trigger factor-the place of contract or the place of the
accident-was the only factor tying the dispute to the Restatement
outcome.8 1 Indeed, opinions disparaging the first Restatement's results as
arbitrary or fortuitous often explicitly mention that the designated trigger is
the only factor pointing in the direction of applying a particular state's law.
82
The correct lesson to be drawn from past experience is that any single
factor, viewed in isolation, is likely to provide an arbitrary basis for a choice
of law decision. The conventional accounts detailing the first Restatement's
demise omit the important role that the stand-alone trigger played in
discrediting the first Restatement's approach.
In order to demonstrate the critical importance of the stand-alone
trigger in the first Restatement's demise, we will first provide several
examples of stand-alone trigger fact patterns. Subsequently, we will
demonstrate the importance of stand-alone triggers in pretransition cases
where judges employed escape devices to avoid arbitrary results. Next, we
will demonstrate the central importance of the stand-alone trigger to the
choice of law revolution by surveying the choice of law revolution transition
cases-the vast majority of which evidence a stand-alone trigger fact pattern.
a. Examples of the Stand-Alone Trigger
The two hypothetical cases provided by Richman and Reynolds are
perfect examples of stand-alone triggers. In the first hypothetical, a contract
case, two Connecticut parties negotiate in Connecticut for delivery in
Connecticut.8 3 However, they sign their agreement in Florida while
temporarily present at a trade convention.8 4 In the second example, a tort
case, two Californians are temporarily a few miles south of the California-
81. See infra Part II.B.2.c (describing the cases that cast doubt on the first Restatement
standard).
82. The New York Court of Appeals in Auten v. Auten, for example, observed that New
York's "sole nexus with the matter in dispute--entirely fortuitous, at that-is that it is the place
where the agreement was made and where the trustee, to whom the moneys were in the first
instance to be paid, had his office." Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (N.Y. 1954) (emphases
added). England had "all the truly significant contacts." Id. Likewise, in Babcock v. Jackson, the
Court of Appeals dismissed as "adventitious" Ontario's "sole relationship with the occurrence,"
namely, the place of the injury:
The present action involves injuries sustained by a New York guest as the result of
the negligence of a New York host in the operation of an automobile, garaged,
licensed and undoubtedly insured in New York, in the course of a week-end
journey which began and was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole
relationship with the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the
accident occurred there.
Babcock v.Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963) (emphases added).
83. RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 202.
84. Id.
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Mexico border when they are injured in an accident involving only
themselves.8 5
Both are stand-alone trigger cases in which the trigger is the only
contact pointing to the chosen state's law. The authors treat the results in
both of the above hypotheticals as a paradigm of "form over substance," on
the grounds that the place of contracting and place of injury are intrinsically
irrelevant.8 6 They fail to note, however, the overall pattern and the lopsided
distribution of contacts between the trigger locations (Florida and Mexico)
versus the nontrigger locations (Connecticut and California). These two
examples tap into a common intuition that a single factor-whether it is the
territorial last act, the place of domicile, or a different single factor-
standing by itself may not outweigh the remaining factors when the
remaining factors all point toward a different state.
Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll supports this intuition. s 7
The domicile of both parties, the negligent conduct, and the employment
contract all pointed toward Alabama; only the place of injury pointed toward
Mississippi. 88 The place of injury, as the stand-alone trigger, resulted in
application of Mississippi law in a dispute in which every other connecting
factor was clustered in Alabama.8 9 Choice of law "first principles" mandated
that the Alabama judge ignore what can only be described as an
overwhelming set of contacts with Alabama and apply the law of a state with
a single tenuous connection to the dispute.90 The case does not demonstrate
the general inadequacies of the first Restatement's chosen trigger factor
(e.g., the irrationality of reliance on territorial connecting factors) so much as
the first Restatement's specific inability to logically resolve cases in which the
trigger stands alone. When judges began to recognize the arbitrariness
inherent in the first Restatement's illogical resolution of stand-alone trigger
cases,judges turned to escape devices.
b. Escape Devices
Many of the familiar escape-device cases in which courts reached
sensible results by recharacterizing the dispute also featured stand-alone
triggers. In Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., for example, the driver
had obtained a car from a rental agency located in Connecticut, the driver
and passenger were from Connecticut, Connecticut was the forum, and the
accident occurred in Massachusetts; thus, only the first Restatement's trigger
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Ala. Great S. R.R_ Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892).
88. Id. at 803-0-4.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 809.
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factor pointed toward Massachusetts.9 1  In Grant v. McAuliffe92  and
Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co.,93 likewise, the only factor tying the
case to the supposedly applicable law was the first Restatement's trigger
factor. 94 The remaining contacts in both cases all clustered around a
different jurisdiction.
Numerous cases employing the public policy exception also involve a
stand-alone trigger.9 5 In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, the Restatement trigger
(the place of injury) was the only contact pointing toward Massachusetts.96
The other contacts pointed toward the forum, which was New York.9 7 Citing
both the public policy exception and the substance-procedure distinction,
the New York Court of Appeals disregarded the location of the injury and
applied its own law.
91. Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163, 163 (Conn. 1928). One leading
treatise actually noted this fact about Levy, although nothing much was made of the point:
"Probably," wrote the two authors, "the court also felt justified in applying Connecticut law to a
case where all relevant contacts except the place of injury were in Connecticut." RICHMAN &
REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 163.
92. Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953) (en banc). Grant involved one car owned
and driven by a Californian, which collided in Arizona with another car driven by a Californian.
Id. at 946. The claim was heard as part of the administration of an estate in California. Id.
93. Haumschild v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. 1959). In Haumschil, the plaintiff
and her ex-husband were both Wisconsin domiciliaries and Wisconsin was the forum. Id. at 815.
94. In Levy, the Restatement trigger factor would have been the place of the injury. Levy,
143 A. at 163. In Grant, the trigger factor was the place of the injury. Grant, 264 P.2d at 946. In
Haumschild, the trigger factor was the place of the injury. Haunuchild, 95 N.W.2d at 818. In
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., the trigger factor was the place of the injury. Kilberg v. Ne.
Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 526 (N.Y. 1961).
95. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Sweeney, 262 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Mich. 1978) (stating that Michigan
.public policy should apply to Michigan residents suing in Michigan courts even though the
alleged negligence occurred in Ohio"); Mertz v. Mertz, 3 N.E.2d 597, 599 (N.Y. 1936)
(providing a lopsided scenario in which the New York court relied on "public policy" and
refused to apply Connecticut's interspousal immunity rule); Owen v. Owen, 444 N.W.2d 710,
710, 712 (S.D. 1989) (creating "a limited public policy exception to lex loci delicti" to allow a wife
to recover under South Dakota law when her recovery would have been barred by Indiana's
guest statute; all other factors pointed to the application of South Dakota law-the parties'
residences, the location of their property, the state where they voted, the state where they
licensed their cars, and the state to which the parties returned when the husband completed his
degree); Paul v. Nat'l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 551 (W. Va. 1986) (involving a single car collision in
Indiana causing the death of two WAest Virginia residents briefly present in the state; the only
factor pointing to the application of Indiana law was the place of the accident).
96. Kilberg, 172 N.E.2d at 526. In Kilberg, the plaintiff and his decedent were both New
York domiciliaries. Id. The latter had purchased his ticket in New York for a flight that left from
a New York airport. Id. New York was also the forum. Id.
97. Id. at 526-27.
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c. Transition Cases
Some cases applying escape devices cast doubt upon the first
Restatement generally and, therefore, count as transition cases. 98 Grant v.
McAuliffe provides an example from the California experience. 99 The
California Supreme Court avoided applying Arizona law, the law of the state
where the injury occurred, by employing characterization as an escape
device.' 00 The court reasoned that the relevant issue, survival of actions, was
"procedural." 10 1 In addition to employing an escape device, Grant also
functions as a transition case. 10 2 Its criticism of the first Restatement resulted
in California's first break from the traditional approach and a step on the
road to a modern approach.103 Undoubtedly influencing the result was the
fact that the first Restatement's designated trigger-the place of the
accident-was the only contact pointing toward Arizona. With this stand-
alone trigger case, California began its escape from the first Restatement.
Other cases unabashedly rejected the first Restatement, and they too
showed a pattern of stand-alone triggers. The cases that motivated
abandoning the first Restatement generally involved disputes where the only
contact pointing toward the chosen law was the contact designated by the
vested rights theory.10 4 New York transition cases are especially clear. In
Auten, Judge Fuld pointed out that England had all the truly significant
contacts, including the marital and family domicile and the continuing
domicile of the wife and children; the husband, additionally, was a British
subject.10 5 Further, England had a great concern in the financial well-being
of its domiciliaries, while New York's nexus with the case was "entirely
fortuitous."106 Almost nothing pointed toward applying New York law other
than the Restatement's trigger factor, the place of contracting.10 7 Babcock v.
98. The court in Kilberg, for example, coupled its reliance on characterization and the
public policy exception with the observation that modern air travel provides the possibility of
swift passage across multiple state lines to conclude that, "the place of injury becomes entirely
fortuitous." Id. at 527-28.
99. See Grant, 264 P.2d at 949 (stating that if the survival of a cause of action is purely
procedural, the law of the forum will control).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 947-48.
102. See RogerJ. Traynor, War and Peace in the Conflict of Laws, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 121,
144 (1976) ("After Grant v. McAuliffe, the stones began to roll.").
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text (discussing Auten and Babcock, two cases
that rejected the first Restatement approach).
105. Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102-03 (N.Y. 1954).
106. Id. at 102.
107. Id. The court stated:
Turning to the case before us, examination of the respective contacts with New
York and England compels the conclusion that it is English law which must be
applied to determine the impact and effect to be given the wife's institution of the
1142 [2010]
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CHOICE OF LA W THEORY
Jackson reveals the same pattern. 0 8 The trigger factor-the place of the
injury--was the only factor pointing toward Ontario law, while all the other
contacts were clustered in New York, which was the forum.10 9 As the sole
connection to Ontario was the location of the accident, it is no surprise that
the New York Court of Appeals dismissed the connection to Ontario as too
fortuitous to justify applying Ontario law. 110
Transition cases from other states exhibit the same pattern as the
California and New York decisions-a stand-alone trigger factor as the only
factor supporting the Restatement's choice of law and the other factors all
pointing toward the forum.111 In Ingersoll v. Klein, for example, a car carrying
an Illinois domiciliary crashed through the ice on an Iowa section of the
Mississippi River. 112 In addition to the decedent, the estate's administratrix
and all of the defendants were Illinois residents. 113 As the court pointed out,
"The only basis for applying the Iowa statutes is that the State of Iowa is the
alleged situs of the decedent's death. Under the doctrine of lex loci delicti the
situs of death would be the only consideration in the selection of the
applicable law."'114 The Supreme Court of Illinois applied Illinois, rather
than Iowa, law.115
separation suit. It hardly needs stating that it is England which has all the truly
significant contacts, while this state's sole nexus with the matter in dispute [is]
entirely fortuitous ....
Id.
108. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 279 (N.Y. 1963).
109. Id. at 284.
110. Id. at 284-85. The court stated:
As to that issue, it is New York, the place where the parties resided, where their
guest-host relationship arose and where the trip began and was to end, rather than
Ontario, the place of the fortuitous occurrence of the accident, which has the
dominant contacts and the superior claim for application of its law.
Id.
111. We argue that transition cases tended to have a particularly lopsided distribution of
contacts. Once courts switched to a modem theory, however, the new theory might be applied
to cases with very different distributions of contacts. A small number of single-factor transition
cases do not follow this exact pattern. There are some in which the trigger is isolated, but some
of the other factors point to a third state, rather than to the forum state. For examples of cases
supporting this proposition, see generally Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 550 S.W.2d 453 (Ark.
1977) (en banc), Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2000 MT 55, 298 Mont. 438, 995 P.2d 1002, and
Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964). Additionally, in some cases, like Fox
v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 267 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio 1977), it is unclear from the opinion
whether there were factors pointing to a third state.
112. Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593, 594 (Ill. 1970).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 596.
115. Id. at 597.
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95 IOWA LA WREVIEW
At least thirty other state courts refused to apply the first Restatement
when no other factors supported the Restatement trigger.1 6 A chart
reproduced as an appendix to this Article summarizes the data.'" 7 Examples
include the transitions in Maine,118 Texas, 119 Florida,120 Delaware, 12
1
Pennsylvania, 122 Tennessee, 123 New Hampshire, 24 and Connecticut. 12
5 Of
the forty-one states and the District of Columbia that have repudiated the
first Restatement, thirty-four did so when faced with a lopsided, stand-alone
trigger fact pattern. 126 Only seven states repudiated the first Restatement in
cases where at least one additional contact supported the Restatement
116. See infra Appendix.
117. See infra Appendix (categorizing states on the basis of whether they continue to use the
first Restatement, transitioned away from the first Restatement in a multifactor case, or
transitioned away from the first Restatement in a stand-alone trigger case).
118. Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610, 611, 615 (Me. 1970). The Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine concluded that Maine law should apply when all of the factors pointed to Maine
except the place of the injury. Id. The father and son, both Maine residents, had set out for a
brief trip to Massachusetts with the intent to return directly to Maine. Id. at 611.
119. In Gutierrez v. Collins, the state's highest court applied Texas law when all factors
pointed to Texas except for the place of the injury, which occurred in Zaragosa, Mexico.
Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex. 1979).
120. Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co. arose out of the crash of a small plane in route from
Florida to North Carolina. Bishop v. Fla. Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980).
All of the relevant parties were Florida residents. Id. at 1000. Although the plane crashed in
South Carolina, the Supreme Court of Florida declined to apply South Carolina law, stating that
"[t]he relationship of South Carolina to the personal injury action is limited to the
happenstance of the plane coming into contact with South Carolina soil after developing
engine trouble in unidentified airspace." Id.
121. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38, 43 (Del. 1991).
122. Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 805-06 (Pa. 1964). The decedent had
purchased his ticket in Pennsylvania; the plane took off from Philadelphia; and United Air
lines, the defendant, regularly conducted business in Pennsylvania. Id. Excepting United's
technical place of incorporation, Delaware, and principal place of business, Illinois, all other
factors pointed to Pennsylvania except the arbitrary location of the plane crash and the situs of
the decedent's death, Colorado. Id.
123. Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. 1992). In Hataway, the parents of a
deceased Tennessee university student brought a wrongful-death action against a university
scuba diving instructor whose alleged negligence led to the death of their son. Id. at 54. All of
the factors except the place of the injury, which was Arkansas, pointed toward Tennessee. Id. at
60.
124. Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 210 (N.H. 1966). In Clark, a wife sued her husband,
alleging his negligence in an automobile accident that occurred in Vermont. Id. at 206. All of
the factors-domicile, relationship of the parties, forum--except for the place of the injury,
pointed to New Hampshire. Id. at 209.
125. O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 25 (Conn. 1986). Although the automobile
accident giving rise to the tort claims at issue took place in Quebec, Canada, all of the other
factors pointed to the application of Connecticut law-both parties' domiciles, the forum, the
place of the relationship between the parties, and the place where the alleged medical expenses
and lost wages were suffered. Id. at 15.
126. See infra Appendix (listing all of the states that have transitioned with a single-factor
trigger).
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CHOICE OF LA W THEORY
trigger factor. 127 Thus, approximately eighty-three percent of Restatement
repudiations occurred in the context that we identify as the first
Restatement's Achilles' heel--one stand-alone contact, such as the place of
injury in tort cases, arrayed against every other factor, including the parties'
common domicile, pointing toward a different state (typically, the
forum) .128
Conventional wisdom is that states repudiated the first Restatement
because territorial connections are arbitrary and the first Restatement's logic
made no provision for "substantive policies" underlying the contending legal
rules.129 A better explanation, and one omitted from the conventional
account, focuses on the fact that in almost every one of the important
transition cases the court faced a stand-alone trigger.'30 As we will now
examine, this can hardly be a coincidence.
III. SINGLE-FACTOR THEORIES AND THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE STAND-ALONE TRIGGER
What explains the predominance of stand-alone trigger cases wherever
judges sought to escape or reject the first Restatement? The reason that the
trigger stood alone in an overwhelmingly large number of the escape devices
and transition cases is that these were the cases where the Restatement result
was least satisfactory. The motivation to reject the first Restatement would
have been highest in cases where its consequences were least acceptable, and
for the Restatement this would have been the case where the choice of a
particular state's law turned on only one isolated factor.
Many state courts continued using the first Restatement, it seems, until
the time that their appellate courts finally had to deal with this one very
specific and particularly problematic fact pattern. 13 ' Even after the
revolution was well underway in the academic journals and in other states,
courts generally seemed to hold off following suit until the facts of a
particular case made the reform argument compelling. 132 The result was
127. See infra Appendix (listing the states that have transitioned with a multifactor
transition). The remaining states still use the first Restatement. See infra Appendix (listing nine
states that continue to follow the first Restatement).
128. See infra Appendix (listing the forty-one states that had a single-factor transition).
129. See, e.g., RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 202 (introducing the contract-
formation example, the authors state that "[a] far more serious problem with the First
Restatement is that it often chooses the law of a state with no interest in the resolution of the
dispute").
130. See supra notes 98-129 and accompanying text (highlighting various state transition
cases).
131. See infra note 132 (discussing how the courts have been slow to transition from the first
Restatement).
132. The majority of the courts that have transitioned did so in the late 1960s and early
1970s. Courts transitioned at a trickle: one in 1957, one in 1963, one in 1964, one in 1965, one
in 1966, four in 1967, four in 1968, one in 1969, two in 1970, one in 1971, one in 1972, two in
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that a very high percentage of transition decisions are stand-alone trigger
cases.
The key issues, then, are why stand-alone trigger cases arise under the
first Restatement and why they are the most difficult to resolve. The answer
to the first is simple: It traces to the first Restatement's single-factor logical
structure. 133 The answer to the second is that any single connecting factor,
taken out of context and viewed in isolation, is likely to appear arbitrary and
"fortuitous."'
34
A. SINGLE-FACTOR VERSUS MULTIFACTOR THEORIES
The anomalies that sparked the choice of law revolution were possible
only because the first Restatement designates a single trigger as dispositive of
the entire choice of law issue. 135 The first Restatement generates stand-alone
trigger cases because it is logically structured so that choice of law turns on
the location of a single event-the injury in tort cases or the formation of a
contract in contractual disputes, for example. The first Restatement is a
single-factor theory, meaning that it designates a single factor as the trigger
and the locations of any other persons or events are dismissed as
irrelevant. 136
Traditional choice of law theory's preoccupation with single-factor
approaches reveals underlying assumptions about the nature and objectives
of the choice of law process. Academic analysis of the choice of law process
generally presumes that the essential elements of the choice of law
determination are individual connecting factors and not the case as a whole.
One might describe the issue as being analyzed on an atomic rather than a
molecular level. Equally implicit is the assumption that not all individual
contacts are relevant. The object of choice of law theory, scholars assume, is
1973, one in 1974, two in 1976, one in 1977, one in 1979, one in 1980, one in 1981, two in 1982,
one in 1986, one in 1987, one in 1989, one in 1991, two in 1992, one in 1996, one in 1997, one
in 2000, and one in 2008. See infra Appendix (listing states that have transitioned). We think this
slow pace demonstrates that the courts were not motivated to transition solely because they
preferred the modem theories to the first Restatement; rather, the courts were motivated to
transition when they were faced with a difficult, lopsided case. We also think it is noteworthy
that, of the seven transition cases that did not involve lopsided fact patterns, four of those cases
were quite late-1980, 1989, 1997, and 2008. Courts making those late transitions could easily
have examined the myriad of single-factor cases motivating the transition in other states and
been convinced, such that they no longer needed to wait on a single-factor scenario in their
own states.
133. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing the first Restatement's
approach and its shortcomings).
134. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text (discussing Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d
792 (N.Y. 1965), and arbitrariness and fortuitousness as they relate to stand-alone triggers).
135. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing the first Restatement's
approach).
136. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing the first Restatement's
approach).
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CHOICE OF LA W THEORY
to differentiate between the single inherently relevant connecting factor-
the trigger-and the intrinsically irrelevant connections that form the
factual background of the remainder of the case.
Single-factor theories take for granted that there is a single contact that
is sufficient, by virtue of its special jurisprudential characteristics, to justify
application of a particular state's law. Once that factor is identified, other
connections to other states are irrelevant. Single-factor analysis is
"either/or"-it is either factor X or factor Y, but not both-and the
enterprise is "winner take all." The consequence is that once the territorial
orientation of the trigger factor is known, it is not necessary to determine
whether or how many other factors point to the same state. Having a larger
or a smaller number of connections to a particular state does not make the
case for applying local law any stronger or any weaker under such single-
factor analysis. 137
Return for a moment to the hypothetical choice of law problem
provided at the outset. 138  It involved a North Carolina clothing
manufacturer and a New York retailer that negotiated and accepted a
contract in North Carolina. 139 The parties made the agreement expressly
subject to North Carolina law and North Carolina was the location of the
breach. 140 The first Restatement would subject this agreement to North
Carolina law because the acceptance occurred in North Carolina.14 1 The
result itself is certainly not unfair, given the predominance of North
Carolina contacts, but it relies on problematic reasoning.
The reasoning commits a court to applying North Carolina law to a case
in which the only contact was the mailing of the acceptance. 142 For instance,
in a case where both parties, the negotiations, the breach, and the choice of
law clause all point toward New York and the mailing of the acceptance
stands alone in pointing to North Carolina, the Restatement would require
application of North Carolina law. Any single-factor approach is vulnerable
to counterexamples of this sort because the reasoning underlying a single-
factor theory focuses exclusively on the importance of that single factor. A
multifactor theory that attributes the application of North Carolina law in
137. A center-of-gravity approach would not simply create a new single-factor trigger in the
form of the location of the most contacts because such an approach allows judges the flexibility
to assign varying weights to different contacts, depending on the factual scenario. More
importantly, a center-of-gravity approach does not create a hard-line, precedential rule
elevating any particular factor to preeminence.
138. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (setting forth the problem and the various
factors that could inform the choice of law analysis).
139. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (naming the location of acceptance as the
single-factor trigger in contract cases).
142. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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the first hypothetical to the overall orientation toward North Carolina, in
contrast, does not have this consequence.
The assumption that only a single factor matters might have constituted
harmless error in an earlier historical period. The first Restatement was
drafted at a time when it was safe to assume that in most cases the "last act"
was in the same state as at least some of the other events making up the
dispute. During the first quarter of the twentieth century, transportation and
communication were slower and more difficult than they are today; face-to-
face disputes were the norm, with few widely dispersed legal problems. By
applying the law of the state where the "last act" took place, a court would be
applying home-state law for most of the other contacts as well because most
of these contacts would be located in the same state as the last act.
Such an assumption is less plausible today. The intervening seven
decades since the first Restatement's drafting have seen the advent of
commercial air travel, mass product distribution, television, telephones, fax
machines, e-mail and text messaging, large-scale mail-order and internet
businesses, long-distance car trips, and many other technological
innovations and social changes that break open or loosen bonds of
geographical proximity that at one time kept the behavior's consequences
close to the behavior itself.143 It is suggestive in this regard how many of the
transition cases involved long distance communications and travel-airplane
crashes, family road trips, and the like. 144
Under present conditions, the location of the trigger contact tells little
or nothing about where the other factors are, and vice versa. It is not
possible to justify applying the law of the trigger state on the basis of
presumed geographical identity with other occurrences in the case. Single-
143. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 527-28 (N.Y. 1961). The court
stated:
Modem conditions make it unjust and anomalous to subject the traveling citizen of
this State to the varying laws of other States through and over which they move....
An air traveler from New York may in a flight of a few hours' duration pass through
several of those commonwealths.... The place of injury becomes entirely
fortuitous.
Id. at 527; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314, 317 (Colo. 1973) (explaining the
merits of applying the law of a state other than that in which the harm occurred); Beaulieu v.
Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610, 613 (Me. 1970) (applying Maine law where both parties lived in Maine
but the automobile accident occurred in Massachusetts); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203
A.2d 796, 801 (Pa. 1964) (applying Pennsylvania law where the decedent was a Pennsylvania
resident but the airplane crashed in Colorado).
144. See, e.g., Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 784 (D. Conn. 1982) (plane
crash); Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944, 946 (Cal. 1953) (en banc) (automobile trip); First Nat'l
Bank, 514 P.2d at 317 (plane crash); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 17 (Conn. 1986)
(automobile trip); Bishop v. Fla. Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 1980) (plane
crash); Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 206 (N.H. 1966) (automobile trip); Babcock v. Jackson,
191 N.E.2d 279, 280 (N.Y. 1963) (automobile trip); Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 755
(N.D. 1972) (automobile trip); Griffith, 203 A.2d at 805-06 (plane crash).
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factor theories, including the first Restatement, have not adjusted to meet
these changed conditions and are incapable of providing fair andjust results
under modern conditions. Stand-alone trigger cases are, therefore, the
Achilles' heel of single-factor theories.
B. THE ACHILLES'HEEL OF SINGLE-FACTOR THEORIES
The reasons that the first Restatement cannot easily deal with stand-
alone trigger cases are readily apparent. A stand-alone contact appears
arbitrary and fortuitous because its isolation leaves its location detached
from the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant. Where the
contacts are dispersed, as they often are today-or even worse, where all but
one are oriented in one direction while the trigger points somewhere else-
basing the decision on the stand-alone contact appears arbitrary and
fortuitous.
The connection between arbitrariness or fortuity and stand-alone
triggers is illustrated by Dym v. Gordon.145 Dym was an early guest-statute case
heard by the New York Court of Appeals, one of Babcock's progeny. Unlike
Babcock, which applied New York law to a case in which the only connection
to the guest-statute state was that the accident occurred there, Dym applied
the law of the place of injury, Colorado, because the place of injury was not a
stand-alone trigger. Dym's result was not accomplished, however, by
reverting to the first Restatement. Rather, the location of the injury counted
toward applying Colorado law because, unlike the place of injury in Babcock,
the location of the injury in Dym was not fortuitous.
The Dym court distinguished Babcock on the grounds that in Babcock the
parties resided full-time in New York while in Dym the host and the guest
had been "temporarily residing" in Colorado at a six-week-long summer
session. 146 Both parties in Dym were legally New York domiciliaries, but they
had not traveled together to the summer session, and apparently had not
even known each other in New York. 147 The parties, therefore, formed the
"host-guest relationship" in Colorado. 148 The short drive, additionally, was to
begin and end in Colorado and the parties expected to travel entirely within
the state of Colorado. 149 The New York Court of Appeals wrote that the
accident's occurrence in Colorado "could in no sense be termed fortuitous"
because the parties were "dwelling in Colorado when the relationship was
formed and the accident arose out of Colorado based activity." 150 In Dym,
145. Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1965).
146. Id. at 793.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 794.
149. Id. at 793.
150. Dym, 209 N.E.2d at 794.
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the trigger-Colorado, as the place of the accident-did not stand alone
and application of Colorado law was therefore not arbitrary.
This conclusion-that a court will most likely perceive a contact as
arbitrary or fortuitous if it is the only connection to the particular state in
question-makes sense. The classic example of an arbitrary or fortuitous
place of injury is an airplane crash. When a plane engine malfunctions and
the plane falls to earth, there is typically no discernible reason why it hits
ground in one place rather than another.151 This example suggests that
whether the location of some occurrence is fortuitous depends somehow on
whether there is a plausible reason why it happened where it did. The Dym
opinion linked this question-the existence of a reason-to the question of
whether there were other background contacts between the dispute and the
State of Colorado. 152 The background of a dispute is relevant to establishing
whether the location of an injury is fortuitous because it is such background
connections between the state and the dispute that make it logical for the
injury to have happened where it did. Rebutting the fortuity argument
requires tying the state and the dispute together with background facts.
In Dym, any explanation for the injury occurring in Colorado would
obviously have to be grounded in the dispute's multiple Colorado
connections-the parties' temporary Colorado residences, the Colorado
formation of the parties' relationship, and so forth. An explanation that
made no reference to Colorado could hardly have rationalized how it was
that the accident happened to take place there. With no background
connection of any kind to single out Colorado, it would be no more logical
for the accident to happen in Colorado than in any of the other states that
had no connection to the dispute. But given the number of connections
between the dispute and Colorado, it was much more likely that the injury
would happen there, and thus the location of the accident was not
fortuitous.
The first Restatement is structured in such a way that a court need not
corroborate the place of contracting or injury with additional contacts for
that state's law to apply. 153 A single contact is a sufficient basis for choosing
the applicable law. Such results are hard to defend when they occur,
however. The appearance of such "hard cases"-cases with which the first
151. Plane crashes present a particularly compelling case for the arbitrary nature of a
single-factor test. See, e.g., Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 784-85 (D. Conn. 1982)
(holding that Connecticut's guest-passenger statute applied in a wrongful-death action due to
plane crash where the single connection to Connecticut was the at-death residence of the
decedents); First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314, 317 (Colo. 1973) (discussing the general
undesirability of a single-factor approach); Bishop v. Fla. Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999,
1000 (Fla. 1980) (stating that Florida's conflicts rules applied to determine that the South
Carolina guest-passenger statute governed based solely on location of the plane crash).
152. Dym, 209 N.E.2d at 794.
153. See supra note 17 (stating that the first Restatement required a single factor-location
of injury-to determine choice of law).
1150 [2010]
HeinOnline -- 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1150 2009-2010
0 REVIEW
r- l rado, l ce f t-did t l e
tion f o l f re t
i -that t il li l i e t
r t i ticular
- es . i le r t it s
l e e tions
e t , l r ible
l ce t er 151 is l ts t
r ce t s s
r l s n t
i n ed t e e t tion
r r r r und t een te e
te 152 round t t i ing
r se round
t t l e
i . i t it t
te r d
ti n rring o l
t 's i le
i s-the s' r i s,
' i , tion
e o l lized






' ly.153 i t i
le ,
ce e ses
. l t ti l l lli f r t r itr r t r f
i t t. , . ., l t . t t , . . , - ( . . )
( l i t t ti t' t- r st t t li i r f l-<!eath ti t
l t i l ti t ti t t t- t r i f t
' . ) t
it t r ; . l . t i t ., . ,
' t
er .
. , . . t .
. e ra ( t ti t t t i t t t t r ir i l t l ti
i la
5
i o a t d n
i r r o
l on l t e y v






i e o t
i o i t c f






i r y e











CHOICE OF LA W THEORY
Restatement understandably found it difficult to deal-occasioned the
transition away from the traditional theory. Once isolated from any other
contacts, the place of injury or place of contracting appears an irrational
basis for the application of a particular law.
It is not unfair to test the first Restatement against all cases that it
purports to resolve, including the ones where the trigger had no support
from any other connecting factors. What may be unfair, however, is to test
both the first Restatement and the modern theories against the cases that
are difficult for the first Restatement, while disregarding cases that would be
difficult for modern theories but that the first Restatement could easily
solve. On examination, it appears that modern approaches to choice of law
have as many hard cases as traditional approaches and for much the same
reason. Governmental interest analysis, for example, also treats a single
factor as sufficient tojustify applying a particular state's law.
IV. MODERN APPROACHES TO CHOICE OF LAW
Not only does the first Restatement struggle with stand-alone trigger
cases, but the modern approaches to choice of law struggle with stand-alone
trigger cases as well. The key consideration is whether a method generates
results that are supported by a single, stand-alone factor-governmental
interest analysis is as likely as the first Restatement to do so.1 54 Without
awareness of what they were doing, modern critics replicated one of the
most problematic aspects of the theory they criticized. The very
characteristic that drove academic commentators and judges away from the
first Restatement-that it was single factor in structure-infects the modern
interest-based theories that replaced it.155
There are, however, few alternatives to single-factor theories available in
the literature. 156 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws can be
interpreted in a way that avoids these problems, but typically courts have not
done so. 157 We can avoid the problems by adopting a weighing or balancing
approach, but weighing and balancing have their own problems. 158 We
recommend investigating such alternatives, however, as an antidote to the
sterile metaphysics of vested rights and governmental interests. The entire
154. See infra notes 191-206 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of stand-
alone trigger cases in interest-based analysis).
155. See infra notes 189-208, 249-50 and accompanying text (discussing the adequacy of a
single contact in determining choice of law).
156. See infta notes 189-208, 249-50 and accompanying text (discussing the adequacy of a
single contact in determining choice of law).
157. See infra notes 249-51 (discussing the "most significant relationship" standard imposed
by the Restatement (Second)).
158. See infra notes 252-92 and accompanying text (discussing the pros and cons of the
balancing approach as well as its use in courts and other legal contexts).
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context of a case should be taken into account rather than a single, arbitrary
trigger when deciding the proper choice of law.
A. THE MODERN METHODS: STATE POLICIES AND GOVERNMENrAL INTERESTS
Throughout the years following the first Restatement's publication,
well-respected scholars such as Walter Wheeler Cook, David Cavers, Albert
Ehrenzweig, and Ernst Lorenzen attacked the vested rights theory. 159 Most
of these critiques were strongly influenced by the then-novel insights
accompanying the legal-realist school. 160 Brainerd Currie's theory of
governmental interest analysis was the first to fill the void left by the gradual
discrediting of the first Restatement. 161 Currie sought to avoid metaphysical
constructs such as vested rights and grounded his theory, instead, on the
policies underlying the substantive laws in question. 162
1. Governmental Interests Defined
Currie's most distinctive contribution was the concept of a
"governmental interest" or "state interest." Although earlier cases used the
word "interest" sporadically, it was Currie who made the concept what it is
today. 163 In dethroning the traditional core concept of a vested right and
replacing it with that of a state or governmental interest, Currie
revolutionized the choice of law field.164
159. For scholarly writings attacking the vested rights theory, see generally WALTER W.
COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942), BRAINERD CURRIE,
SELECTED EssAYs ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963), David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-
Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REV. 173 (1933), Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the
Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924), and Hessel E. Yntema, The Restatement of the Law of
Conflict of Laws, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 183 (1936).
160. See generally KALMAN, supra note 12 (discussing legal realism).
161. Joseph William Singer, Facing Real Conflicts, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197, 197 (1991)
("Modem choice-of-law analysis is heavily indebted to Brainerd Currie's interest analysis."). For
other scholarly articles discussing Currie's contribution to the field of choice of law, see
generally Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392
(1980), John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 173 (1981), Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A
Response to the 'New Critics,' 34 MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983), and Robert A. Sedler, Interstate
Accidents and the Unprovided for Case: Reflections on Neumeir v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125
(1973).
162. See infra notes 189-208 and accompanying text (discussing stand-alone triggers and
modem analogs to the first Restatement's "escape devices").
163. The Supreme Court has used the word "interest" in a couple of cases. See Pac.
Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 496 (1939) (referring to the
.governmental interests of each jurisdiction"); see also Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 543 (1935) (referring to the state's "interest in affording adequate
protection to this class of its population").
164. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1301, 1302 (1989) (arguing that governmental interest analysis "remains the starting point
for modern choice of law scholarship"); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 277, 278 (1990) ("Brainerd Currie's 'governmental interest analysis' probably remains the
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CHOICE OF LA W THEORY
Currie's basic argument about state or governmental interests started
with the unexceptional claim that substantive laws were the creatures of state
domestic policies and had to be interpreted in light of those policies.
165
Currie argued, as a consequence, that substantive rules could be given
geographical scope by examining the rule's underlying policy objectives.
Determining this geographical scope, he claimed, required nothing more
exotic than "the familiar [processes] of construction or interpretation."' 166
This final claim is quite controversial. 167 Currie sometimes spoke in
terms of courts' duties in a democracy, implying that courts refusing to
follow his proposal acted contrary to the legislature's intentions. 168 At the
same time, however, Currie was well aware that legislatures typically had no
views regarding the proper interstate scope of the substantive laws they
crafted. 169 Subsequent followers of Currie's approach clarified his position:
Despite the casual references to judges' duties in a democracy, Currie did
not believe that any actual legislative preference was involved in the
determination of the territorial reach of a particular state's statute.
170
dominant choice of law theory among academics, but its hold is slipping." (footnote omitted));
Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: Interest Analysis and Its "New Crits," 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 681, 683
(1988) (stating that Currie argued that it is "inherently unsound to choose between competing
laws without reference to the content of those laws"); Robert A. Sedler, The Governmental Interest
Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181, 181 (1977)
("The governmental interest approach formulated by the late Brainerd Currie has been the
catalyst of the modern 'revolution' in choice of law in this country." (footnotes omitted)).
165. See Herma Hill Kay, Currie's Interest Analysis in the 21st Century: Losing the Battle, but
Winning the War, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 123,123 (2001).
166. Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 RECUEIL DES
COURS 19, 53-54 (1989).
167. See Brilmayer, supra note 161, at 393 (commenting on the implausibility of interest
analysis as a theory of constructive intent); Kay, supra note 166, at 57.
168. CURRIE, supra note 159, at 182 ("[A]ssessment of the respective values of the
competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states ... is a function that should not be
committed to courts in a democracy ... ").
169. Id. at 84 ("[T]he legislature has not thought about the matter, and does not want to
think about it."); see also Kay, supra note 166, at 53-54 (explaining Currie's position).
170. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 166, at 53-54 (citing Currie and concluding that "[it follows
from this way of defining the term that, although the state can create its governmental policy
through its legislature, its executive, or its courts, it cannot create a governmental interest
through its own actions"); id. at 126 (referring to "the mistaken assumption that a state can
create a governmental interest in Currie's sense by a simple legislative or judicial declaration
that it has an interest ... it should be clear that such a declaration was not what Currie meant
by a governmental interest"). But see CURRIE, supra note 159, at 171-72 (arguing that legislatures
should specify the territorial reach of the statutes they enact); Kay, supra note 166, at 50-52
(citing CURRIE, supra note 159, at 171-72). Currie stated:
[L]egislatures ... can cultivate the practice of adding to specific enactments a
section specifying the extent to which the law is intended to apply to cases
involving foreign factors ... the value of such directions would be tremendous ...
[because] they would make explicit the policy expressed in the statute, and the
mode of application that will promote that policy.
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95 IOWA LA WREVIEW
Indeed, Currie is characterized as believing that the precise circumstances in
which an interest exists is "external" to the legislative process, such that even
if the legislature did have a preference it would not be authoritative.' 71
Determinations of when state interests exist, it thus appears, are based on a
priori premises on a par with the Bealean definition of vested rights-
interests are theoretical constructs that no degree of legislative preference
can alter.
Currie's proposed analysis spawned an entire new vocabulary. If one
state had an interest and the other did not, the case was called a "false
conflict"; if both states had interests the case was a "true conflict"; and when
neither state had an interest, the case was "unprovided for."172 Currie's
position held that false conflicts should be governed by the law of the only
interested state-the state of the parties' common domicile-while true
conflicts and unprovided-for cases should be governed by the law of
whichever of the two states was in a position to impose its will-the forum. 173
He insisted that state courts should not hesitate about furthering their own
state's interests, even in the face of another state's legitimate competing
interest, because they are state institutions charged with the duty of
enforcing their legislature's intentions for the populace they represent. 174
2. Governmental Interests and Domiciliary Connecting Factors
In assessing whether a state had an interest in applying its law to a
dispute, governmental interest analysis typically followed Currie's discussion
of the early case of Milliken v. Pratt.175 Milliken involved a Massachusetts
CURRIE, supra note 159, at 171-72. Kay stated that a court must make a determination "[ilf the
legislature has not been so obliging as to specify how its domestic policy should be applied to
conflicts cases." Kay, supra note 166, at 51.
171. See Kay, supra note 166, at 127. Kay criticizes Brilmayer, stating:
Brilmayer[] ... confuses "the determination of domestic policy"-which a state
does create by legislative enactment, judicial determination of a common-law rule,
by administrative rule-making, or by executive order-"with the affiliating
circumstances that trigger the application of that policy to the controversy"-which
are external to the state's declarations and cannot be created by it independently.
Id.
172. See generally CURRIE, supra note 159 (explaining conflict of laws).
173. Various authors made suggestions about other ways to resolve the true conflicts and
unprovided-for cases--these included theories asking about "comparative impairment" of the
various interests, and which state had the "better law." See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and
the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23, 33 (1963) (advocating for the principle of comparative
impairment); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 1584, 1586-88 (1966) (providing five factors for determining choice of law, including the
"better rule of law" approach).
174. See CURRIE, supra note 159, at 183-84.
175. Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878); see CURRIE, supra note 159, at 77-127
(discussing Milliken).
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CHOICE OFLAW THEORY
married woman who had guaranteed the debts of her husband. 176 In Maine
her guarantee would have been enforceable but Massachusetts would have
treated it as invalid.177 Currie argued that the Massachusetts law invalidating
contracts signed by married women was for the benefit of Massachusetts
married women while the Maine pro-creditor rule that upheld such
contracts was for the benefit of Maine creditors. Thus, Massachusetts had an
interest in applying its law only if the defendant-married woman resided in
Massachusetts, and Maine had an interest only if the creditor was from
Maine. 178
The emphasis on domiciliary factors in this discussion of Milliken was
typical of Currie's analysis. 179 Haag v. Barnesi80 provides another example of
governmental interest analysis' domiciliary focus. Currie analyzed the fact
pattern in this child-support dispute as follows:
The father is a resident of Illinois, and Illinois has an interest in
applying its policy for his protection. The mother is a resident of
New York, and is custodian of the child, and New York has an
interest in applying its law for the welfare of the child and the
community. 181
Aside from the parties' domiciles, the other contacts in the case were all
irrelevant in Currie's opinion. The rejected contacts included: the
intentions of the parties that Illinois law should apply to their contract
("quite irrelevant" 8 2); the place where the contract was drawn and signed by
the complainant ("also ... irrelevant" ls3); the location of the father's place
of business in Illinois ("seems irrelevant"'8 4); the fact that the child was born
in Illinois ("fortuitous and obviously irrelevant"'8 5 ); the fact that the persons
named in the contract to act as agents for the parties were residents of
Illinois ("seems irrelevant"' 86); the fact that the lawyers who drew up the
contract were residents of Illinois ("irrelevant"); and the fact that all
contributions for support were made from Chicago ("utterly irrelevant" 8 7).
Currie added, finally, that "no one ... would consider for a moment that
anything should turn on whether Mr. Barnes mailed his weekly and monthly
176. Milliken, 125 Mass. at 374
177. Id. at 374-77.
178. CURRIE, supra note 159, at 86.
179. See, e.g., id. at 152 (discussing hypothetical variations on Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d
944 (Cal. 1953) (en banc)); id. at 84 (discussing hypothetical variations on Milliken).
180. Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1961).
181. CURRIE, supra note 159, at 735.
182. Id. at 732.
183. Id. at 733.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. CURRIE, supra note 159, at 734.
187. Id.
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95 IOWA LA WREVIEW
checks from Chicago or had his attorney deliver cash in person in New
York."1 88
Interests, for Currie, were driven by domiciliary connecting factors. 189
As his most articulate defender, Professor Herma Hill Kay explained,
"Currie insisted that people were the focal point of governmental policy....
Currie viewed the state, then, as legitimately concerned with the welfare of
its people." 190 It was adequate justification for application of local law that a
local party would reap the benefit, either as a plaintiff receiving
compensation or as a defendant seeking protection.
3. Interest Analysis as a Single-Factor Theory
Currie's discussion of cases such as Milliken makes clear that under his
theory a single contact-the domicile of the benefiting party-is an
adequate basis on which to determine choice of law and that it does not
matter that all other connections in the case point to a different state.191 In
this respect, governmental interest analysis tracked assumptions made by the
first Restatement. On the surface, the first Restatement and governmental
interest analysis look very dissimilar because different contacts are
important-domiciliary versus territorial-and different theoretical
underpinnings are discussed-state interests versus vested rights. But the
deeper structural similarity is that neither theory attempts to take into
account the connections between a dispute as a whole and the various
contending states.
The potential for stand-alone trigger cases is built into the fundamental
premises on which the modern interest-based theories are constructed.
Upon examination, it appears not only that stand-alone trigger cases are
commonplace in interest-based analyses, but also that they form a subset of
the notoriously intractable true conflicts. 192 Even proponents of interest
analysis concede the problems that true conflicts create. 193 The fact that one
single type of case-the stand-alone trigger case-underlies the difficulties
faced by both modern interest-based and traditional vested rights
approaches is of considerable interest. It suggests that the choice of law
revolution replaced one defective theory with another.
188. Id.
189. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (explaining Currie's view that states'
interests in protecting domiciliaries could be used to justify choice of law).
190. Kay, supra note 166, at 55.
191. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 159, at 84-85 (discussing variations on Milliken v. Pratt in
terms of interests in protecting domiciliaries and stating that "the legislature decides in favor of
protecting married women. What married women? Why, those with whose welfare Massachusetts
is concerned, of course-i.e., Massachusetts married women").
192. See infra notes 194-208 and accompanying text (explaining the problem of true
conflicts and failed attempts to avoid them).
193. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
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CHOICE OF LAW THEORY
a. Stand-Alone Triggers and True Conflicts
A stand-alone trigger case is by definition one in which only a single
factor points toward forum law, the factor designated as the trigger. Under
interest-based analysis, this means that the party who would benefit from
application of forum law is a forum domiciliary-which provides the
necessary interest justifying application of forum law. All the other contacts,
however, point toward other states. The stand-alone trigger case will always
be a true conflict.
Consider first the case where the forum (call it state A) has a law
favoring plaintiffs. Where this is true, state A will have an interest in applying
its law in cases where the plaintiff is from state A. As a result, the stand-alone
trigger case will have a plaintiff from state A but all other factors point to
state B. In the alternative, state A might have the law the defendants prefer.
If state A's law is the one favoring defendants, then it will have an interest in
applying its law in cases where the defendant is from state A. In such
situations, the stand-alone trigger case will have a defendant from A but all
other factors point to state B.
In either of these situations, the case in which the trigger stands alone
will be, under Currie's terminology, a true conflict. 194 In the former
situation (where state A is the state favoring the plaintiff), state A has an
interest because the plaintiff is a state A domiciliary; however, because there
is a state B defendant and a pro-defendant law in that state, state B will have
an interest too. Similar reasoning shows that the latter situation (with state A
having the pro-defendant law) is also a true conflict: state A has a pro-
defendant law and a local defendant, whereas state B has a pro-plaintiff law
and a local plaintiff. Because both states have interests, the case is a true
conflict.
This is not a coincidence: Stand-alone trigger cases will always be true
conflicts. Stand-alone trigger cases cannot be false conflicts. To be a false
conflict the parties would have to share a common domicile, and we have
assumed that all the other contacts point at state B. Nor can they be
unprovided-for cases, for we are assuming that there is one state-the state
at which the trigger points-that has an interest. True conflicts are split-
domicile cases where the two parties each prefer the law of their own state.
Stand-alone trigger cases fall into this category because a single factor stands
alone in pointing toward application of forum law, and it is a factor that
triggers a state interest.
b. True Conflicts and "Escape Devices"
That stand-alone trigger cases, as true conflicts, will present special
problems should be generally conceded. Interest-based analysis has
194. Note that the converse is not true-not all true conflicts are stand-alone trigger cases.
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generally been recognized, even by its own proponents, as failing to provide
a good solution to true conflict cases. 195 Some scholars have argued that
interest-based analysis' chief accomplishment is the identification and
solution of false-conflict situations. 196 Characterized by its proponents as a
win-win solution to a clear nonproblem, the concept of a false conflict has
been hailed as Currie's great contribution to choice of law. 197
Currie himself suggested that where both states had interests, the judge
might consider making "a more moderate and restrained" reinterpretation
of the involved statutes. 198 William Baxter provided a theory called
"comparative impairment" that argued that the best way to resolve true
conflicts was to ask which state's interest would be more impaired by non-
application. 99 Robert Leflar contributed his theory of "choice-influencing
considerations," which was quickly nicknamed the "better law" theory in
recognition of his recommendation that the respective merits of the
contending laws be taken into account.z00 These maneuvers were designed
to resolve the anomalies that Currie's original version of governmental
interest analysis created, according to which true conflicts were resolved by
brute force: The forum did what it wanted. Currie's original
recommendation met considerable resistance in the courts.
The California201 and New York202 courts-among the first to apply
modern choice of law theory-have set aside interests based on a single
195. See Baxter, supra note 173, at 8-9 (explaining that borderline cases present a problem
for interest-based analysis).
196. See William H. Allen & Erin A. O'Hara, Second Generation Law and Economics of Conflict
Laws: Baxter's Comparative Impairment and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1011, 1013-14 (1999).
197. See id.
198. Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1242
(1963).
199. See Baxter, supra note 173, at 33 (arguing that states should use "comparative
impairment" in determining which state's law should control).
200. Leflar, supra note 173, at 1586-88.
201. For example, in Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., the Supreme Court of
California faced a true conflict between the laws of California and Louisiana and ultimately
decided to apply Louisiana law. Offshore Rental Co. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 723 (Cal.
1978). In that case, a California corporation sued a Delaware corporation for the loss of a key
employee who was injured while on the "defendant's premises in Louisiana." Id. California had
an interest in applying its law to the case as the plaintiff corporation was domiciled in
California, and California law would have benefited its domiciliary. Id. However, the California
court held Louisiana law applicable because the vast majority of the factors-the place of injury,
the primary place of business and source of revenue of the California corporation, and the
primary place of business of the defendant Delaware corporation-pointed to the application
of Louisiana law. Id. at 728-29.
202. In Feldman v. Acapulco Princess Hotel, a New York domiciliary brought suit in New York
against a Mexican hotel for injuries sustained on the hotel's premises. Feldman v. Acapulco
Princess Hotel, 520 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). Applying interest analysis, the
Supreme Court of New York determined that it had an interest "in applying its law of unlimited
damages ... to maximize recovery for its domiciliaries." Id. at 486. Mexico likewise had an
interest in protecting its local business-the hotel-and standard practice would have
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CHOICE OF LA W THEORY 1159
stand-alone contact and have taken the overall weight of various factors into
account. They, and other courts, have contributed additional ad hoc
maneuvers, such as complicated special rules,20 3 renvoi,204 the substance-
procedure distinction,20 5 and consideration of territorial connecting factors
that had just a few years earlier been dismissed as arbitrary and fortuitous.20 6
Such manipulation is the direct analog to the first Restatement's "escape
devices."
Interest analysis, clearly, has not resolved the problem of the stand-
alone trigger. It generates such cases because application of a state's law
requires only a single contact and then the other connecting factors are
dismissed as irrelevant. What, then, is to be done? There is only one
mainstream theory that has the potential to avoid the problems that such
assumptions create, and that is the Restatement (Second). 20 7 If courts and
scholars decide that the Restatement (Second) is not suitable, then a final
alternative is the weighing or balancing commonly employed in other areas
of law.208
B. IDENTIFYING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES: CENTER OF
GRAVITYAND THE RESTA TEMENT (SECOND)
The Restatement (Second) is the closest to an existing solution to this
problem in American choice of law theory.20 9 One interpretation of the
Restatement (Second) is that it incorporates many factors into the choice of
law calculation. Another possible interpretation is that it weighs or balances
characterized this dispute as a true conflict, leading to the application of New York law. Id. at
485-87. However, the court was unwilling to rely solely on the plaintiffs domicile-the only
contact with New York-when all of the other factors pointed to the application of Mexican law.
Id. Mexico was the place of the injury, and the plaintiff voluntarily went to Mexico on vacation.
Id. at 486. The New York court stated that "Mexico's interests are more direct and
unambiguous," including the need to protect its tourist industry from unforeseen suits. Id. The
New York court reasoned that "fairness and equality of treatment" weighed in favor of the
application of Mexican law. Id. at 486-87.
203. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (N.Y. 1972) (discussing guest-
passenger rules).
204. See BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 39, at 312 (listing cases where the court used
the renvoi approach).
205. Id. at 315-18.
206. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 720-21 (Cal. 1976) (relying on
territorial factors to resolve a true conflict); Hurtado v. Superior Court of Sacramento County,
522 P.2d 666, 670-72 (Cal. 1974) (relying on territorial factors to resolve an unprovfided-for
case); Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906, 909-10 (Cal. 1961) (relying on territorial factors to
resolve a true conflict).
207. See infra notes 210-38 and accompanying text (describing the background and
provisions of the Restatement (Second)).
208. See infra notes 252-92 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of courts using
a balancing method).
209. See infra notes 210-38 and accompanying text (describing the background and
provisions of the Restatement (Second)).
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95 IOWA LA WREVIEW
the competing connections with different states. Such multifactor
approaches would be less dependent on controversial jurisprudential
assumptions than single-factor approaches, which seem to be looking for a
metaphysical construct, such as vested rights or governmental interests, to
separate the single relevant trigger from all the others.
1. "Center of Gravity": The Road Not Taken
In the middle of the twentieth century, as the New York Court of
Appeals was starting to turn away from the first Restatement, it
experimented briefly with a formulation that became known as "center of
gravity" or "grouping of contacts."210 Judge Fuld's majority opinion in Auten
explained the center-of-gravity or grouping-of-contacts approach as a
continuation of earlier New York precedents that called for application of
the law of the state that "has the most significant contacts with the matter in
dispute."211 Despite its application in New York courts, the center-of-gravity
test was never popular with scholars. 212 Brainerd Currie wrote scornfully:
The "grouping of contacts" theory provides no standard for
determining what "contacts" are significant, or for appraising the
relative significance of the respective groups of "contacts". The
process of "grouping contacts" ... deals in broad generalities about
the "interest" of a state in applying its law without inquiry into how
the "contacts" in question relate to the policies expressed in
specific laws. One "contact" seems to be about as good as another
for almost any purpose.213
Although the New York Court of Appeals did not pursue the grouping-
of-contacts or center-of-gravity theory for long-later opinions such as
Babcock v. Jackson were more in line with governmental interest analysis-
210. See, e.g., RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 205-07 ("Beginning with Auten v.
Auten, however, a frontal attack began in the courts as they started to experiment with new
approaches to choice-of-law problems." (footnote omitted)).
211. Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (N.Y. 1954) (quoting Rubin v. Irving Trust Co.,
113 N.E.2d 424, 431 (N.Y. 1953)).
212. For criticism of the center-of-gravity approach, see RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note
10, at 213 n.44 (citing Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The Restatement (First,
Second) and Interest Analysis, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 359 (1997)).
213. CURRIE, supra note 159, at 727-28; see also RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 213
n.44 ("[The grouping-of-contacts approach) offers no way of measuring the significance of
contacts, and, without a measure of significance, the center of gravity system amounts to little
more than contract [sic] counting." (citing Shaman, supra note 212, at 359)). Currie objected
to the air of confident objectivity that the enterprise projected, comparing the grouping-of-
contacts approach to the place-of-injury rule. CURRIE, supra note 159, at 727-28.
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CHOICE OF LA W THEORY
Auten's influence continued to be felt when the drafters of the Restatement
(Second) formulated their most-significant-relationship test.2 14
2. The Most-Significant-Relationship Test-Restatement (Second)
The American Law Institute's drafting of the Restatement (Second)
spanned almost twenty years, from 1952215 to 1969,216 with the completed
two-volume set published in 1971.217 The drafting committee faced
somewhat of a moving target. In addition to the burgeoning academic
literature, the cutting-edge conflicts decisions issued during this time period
included Grant v. McAuliffe,218 Auten v. Auten,219 and Babcock v. Jackson.220
Academic feedback on the early drafts of the Restatement (Second) was
strongly negative.22 1 Consequently, the drafting committee attempted to
compromise, combining premises from several different modern theories.
222
The Restatement (Second) has three levels of analysis, ranging from the
very general to the very specific. 223 At the most general end of the spectrum
is section 6, which has been called "the heart of the Restatement
(Second)." 224 Section 6 sets out the basic principles for choice of law
decision-making. The principles that it cites are commonly referred to as the
"most-significant-relationship" test.225 The considerations listed in section 6
include factors such as promoting uniformity and predictability,
214. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 213 ("The early drafts of these sections are the
lineal descendants of the 'center of gravity' opinions that appeared early in the choice-of-law
revolution, especially in New York.").
215. Patrick J. Borchers, Courts & the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some Observations & an
Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REv. 1232, 1232 (1997).
216. Michael S. Finch, Choice-ofLaw Problems in Florida Courts: A Retrospective on the Restatement
(Second), 24 STETSON L. REV. 653, 655 (1995).
217. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds II, Prologomenon to an Empirical Restatement
of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 417, 417-18, 420 (2000).
218. Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953) (en banc).
219. Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954).
220. Babcock v.Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
221. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754,
755 (1963).
222. See Korn, supra note 56, at 817 ("The final product is a transitional document,
reflecting the period's mood of flexibility and openness to new ideas, while refusing to abandon
past learning entirely and remaining committed to the principle of decision according to rule
to the extent that satisfactory rules exist or can be developed.").
223. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 208 ("Three basic elements define the choice-
of-law approach of the Second Restatement: (1) § 6 and the most significant relationship, (2) a
few grouping-of-contacts sections and (3) numerous sections that provide choice-of-law rules for
specific legal claims and issues.").
224. Id. at 209; see also id. at 214 ("Thus, wth either the specific sections or the general
grouping-of-contacts sections, eventually the court will need to apply the factors of § 6(2).").
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 6,145 (1971).
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1162 95 IOWA LAWRE VIEW [2010]
simplification of the judicial task, and respect for substantive policies. 226 No
guidance is provided on how to combine them.
At a slightly less elevated level of generality are those Restatement
(Second) sections listing the basic principles for particular areas of law such
as section 145 for torts227 and section 188 for contracts.228 These sections are
sometimes called the grouping-of-contacts provisions, and show the direct
influence of the early New York cases such as Auten.229 The contacts for
contract cases include: the place of contracting, the place of negotiation of
the contract, the place of performance, the location of the subject matter of
226. Id. § 6.
227. Id. § 145. The General Principle for torts provides:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
Id.
228. Section 187 deals with the effect of party selection of the applicable law. Id. § 187
(discussing contractual choice of law clauses). Section 188, titled "Law Governing in Absence of
Effective Choice by the Parties," provides as follows:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of that state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the
principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the
contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the
law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and,
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiation of the contract and the place of performance are in
the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as otherwise
provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
Id. § 188.
229. RIcH MAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 213.
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CHOICE OF LAW THEORY
the contract, and the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation, and place of business of the parties.230 For torts, analogously,
the judge is instructed to take into account the place where the injury
occurred, the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, place of business of
the parties, and the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.231 In both contexts, the text instructs that "[t]hese contacts are
to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue" and with due regard to the principles of section 6.232
At the most specific end of the spectrum, the Restatement (Second)
provides rules specifying which state's law presumptively applies when a case
involves certain substantive issues.233 Section 148, for example, addresses the
torts of fraud and misrepresentation:
§ 148. Fraud and Misrepresentation
(1) When the plaintiff has suffered pecuniary harm on account of
his reliance on the defendant's false representations and when the
plaintiffs action in reliance took place in the state where the false
representations were made and received, the local law of this state
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the
occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the
other state will be applied.2 3
4
In the material on choice of law for contracts, similarly, section 192
deals with contracts for the sale of life insurance.23 5 Remarks one authority:
For most contracts, the Restatement (Second) presumes that a
specific law will be applied unless the presumption is rebutted by
"the principles of § 6". Nine sections deal with particular
contracts ....
230. See supra note 228.
231. See supra note 227.
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188.
233. See, e.g., id. § 154 (addressing "Interference with Marriage Relationships"). This section
provides:
The local law of the state where the conduct complained of principally occurred
determines the liability of one who interferes with a marriage relationship, unless,
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under
the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law
of the other state will be applied.
Id. (emphasis added).
234. Id. § 148.
235. Id. § 192 (Life Insurance Contracts).
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95 IOWA LA WREVIEW
The Restatement details nine rules for specific types of
contracts ....
Where the Restatement sets forth a presumption concerning a
specific problem, it usually maintains the most significant
relationship test in reserve. 236
Most of these rules reflect a territorial orientation, for example by
choosing the law of the place where certain conduct occurred. Some refer
the reader instead to the general instructions on torts or contracts. 237 All of
them incorporate references to the principles of section 6.238
3. The Restatement (Second): Single or Multifactor Theory?
A multifactor interpretation can easily fit within the confines of the
middle-tier grouping-of-contacts sections, such as sections 145 and 188. This
is not surprising, considering the historical link between these two sections
and the early New York grouping-of-contacts cases such as Auten v. Auten.23 9
These middle-tier sections contain suggestions about combining factors that
might result in applying a particular state's law, although these are phrased
quite flexibly in terms of what will "usually" happen. 240
For sections 145 (torts) and 188 (contracts), the listed contacts are put
forward under the guise of interpreting and applying section 6.241 Section 6,
236. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 229.
237. Id. at 211.
238. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 154. Section 154, "Interference
with Marriage Relationship," provides:
The local law of the state where the conduct complained of principally occurred
determines the liability of one who interferes with a marriage relationship, unless,
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship
under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the
local law of the other state will be applied.
Id. (emphasis added).
239. See Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102-03 (N.Y. 1954) (applying the "grouping of
contacts theory"); see also supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text (illustrating a case that
based the choice of law on a single factor).
240. For example, paragraph 3 of section 188 names two contacts that, if satisfied, will
usually determine the outcome-place of negotiation and place of performance. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188. Section 188 provides: "(3) If the place of negotiating the
contract and the place of performance are in the same state, the local law of this state will
usually be applied, except as otherwise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203." Id.
241. Section 145 prefaces this list of contacts with the following language: "(1) The rights
and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of
that state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6." Id. § 145. Section 188 similarly
prefaces its list of contacts for contracts cases as follows: "(1) The rights and duties of the parties
with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of that state which, with
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties
under the principles stated in § 6." Id. § 188.
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CHOICE OF LA W THEORY
on its face, seems to be almost as geared toward multifactor analysis as
sections 145 and 188-it does not purport to restrict what may be
considered but leaves the judge free to take into account all of the
important factors that are likely to arise in a tort or contract case. 242
The Restatement (Second)'s detailed rules regarding particular
substantive issues are almost as accommodating to multifactor approaches as
the other two tiers. The more specific rules are typically rebuttable
presumptions that can be overridden by section 6 or by the middle-level
sections (sections 145 and 188). Take for example section 192:
§ 192. Life Insurance Contracts
The validity of a life insurance contract issued to the insured upon
his application and the rights created thereby are determined, in
the absence of an effective choice of law by the insured in his
application, by the local law of the state where the insured was
domiciled at the time the policy was applied for, unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the
transaction and the parties, in which event the local law of the
other state will be applied. 243
This section appears to impose a single-factor test-"the local law of the
state where the insured was domiciled at the time the policy was applied
for."244 However, this rule is a rebuttable presumption which does not apply
if "some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in Section 6."245 The qualifying clause represents a door deliberately
left open for consideration of additional factors.
Despite this apparent open door, some modern interest-oriented
academics downplay the importance of the lists of contacts and presumptive
rules, seeing everything through the lens of interests as their theory defines
them. Faced with the language of sections 145 and 188, they point out that
these contacts are supposed to be evaluated with respect to the requirements
of section 6.246
Section 6, in their view, restricts the contacts that can be taken into
account, through its references to policies and interests. 247 Sections 6(2) (b),
242. Id. § 6.
243. Id. § 192.
244. Id.
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 192.
246. See id. § 145(2) ("Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include.. . ."); id. § 188(2) ("In the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the contacts [are] to be taken into account in
applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue . ).
247. RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 214. The authors state:
[Tihe final version of § 145 calls for application of the law of "the state which ...
has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
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(c), and (e) refer to effectuation of the policies of the forum and "other
interested states." 248 In particular, some claim that the application of section
6 reflects the usual interest-based analyst's categorization-false conflicts,
true conflicts, and unprovided-for cases-and this analytical scheme bars the
possibility of considering contact counting or grouping of contacts.249
Professor Louise Weinberg argues strongly for this position, referring to
the Restatement (Second) as imposing a "most significant contact" test.250
Her use of the singular noun "contact" suggests that the Restatement
(Second) requires designation of a single contact for a particular issue.
Despite her use of quotation marks to set off the formula, the singular form
does not appear in the Restatement (Second)'s text. Rather, the verbal
shorthand actually employed in the Restatement (Second) is "most
significant relationship."251 That formula-most significant relationship-
might refer either to the relationship between the case as a whole and the
dispute (a multifactor interpretation) or the existence of a single contact
that relates the dispute to the state in question (a single-factor
interpretation).
Professor Weinberg's interpretation cannot be taken as definitively
established-the Restatement (Second) does not directly address the
question of interest here-but neither can it be definitively rejected. The
Restatement (Second) would appear to be 'available for a flexible,
multifactor analysis if judges decide that they wanted to use it that way. We
believe that they should.
principles stated in § 6." Correspondingly, the role of the enumerated contacts is
diminished; they are simply "to be taken into account in applying the principles of
§ 6."
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145).
248. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTOF LAWS § 6(2) (b), (c), (e).
249. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 214. The authors state:
Section 6(2)(b) and (c) clearly contemplate performing some sort of interest
analysis. Presumably if that analysis indicates a false conflict, the court should apply
the law of the only interested state. If the case is a non-false conflict, the court
should use the factors of § 6(2) (d)-(g) to resolve the true conflict or unprovided-
for case. In no event, however, should the court use the grouping-of-contacts sections to
justizy a center-of-gravity or contact-counting approach. The contacts enumerated in the
grouping-of-contacts sections have no independent signicance and are relevant only insofar
as they implicate the factors of § 6(2).
Id. (emphasis added).
250. Louise Weinberg, A Structural Revision of the Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. L.J. 475, 479
(2000) (referring to the Restatement (Second)'s master rule as "the law of the place of 'most
significant contact'"); see also id. at 479-80 ("Courts are told to go to the 'place of most
significant contact,' but where is that place?").
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.
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CHOICE OF LAW THEORY
C. THE PROS AND CONS OF BALANCING
Assuming that the Restatement (Second) is considered an
inappropriate vehicle for adopting a multifactor approach, we believe the
best way to structure a new multifactor method is by weighing or balancing
the competing contacts.252 The grouping-of-contacts or center-of-gravity
formulations from the early New York Court of Appeals cases could be
pressed into service here, for they are strongly reminiscent of the weighing
or balancing employed in other areas of law. But not every judge or
academic is fond of weighing and balancing. We close our argument,
therefore, with some consideration of the merits and demerits of weighing
and balancing, as a general matter.
1. Judges' Preferences
On the pro side, there is reason to believe that judges generally prefer
multifactor approaches. Judge Frank Coffin asserts that, when faced with
multiple interests, judges are naturally drawn to balancing. 253 In choice of
law specifically, the long history of judicially created escape devices, while
highly suggestive, is not the only indication that judges are not entirely
satisfied with single-factor approaches. The Restatement (Second) has been
well received by courts, which suggests a judicial responsiveness to the
choice of law approach that is most inclusive of a variety of factors.
The way that judges have written choice of law opinions confirms that
judges concern themselves with many more factors than academics have
recognized. No matter how widely endorsed by academics a particular
triggering factor seems to be, judges typically cite not only that contact but
also every other contact that points toward the same state.254 Judges do not
just recite such supporting facts at an opinion's outset where they might
dismiss those facts as merely extraneous background, but typically cite them
in the part of the opinion that explains and justifies the result as well.2 55
252. Even if choice of law is undertaken by reference to a multifactor interpretation of the
Restatement (Second), some form of weighing or balancing would be necessary to collect and
combine the different considerations and contacts into a single answer to the question, "What
law applies?"
253. Frank M. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales ofJustice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16, 21
(1988).
254. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963). Additionally, consider
Haag v. Barnes, a child-support case in which the opinion lists the following as contacts: where
the parties are from; the location of the child's birth; the fact that the people acting as agents
were from Illinois; and the place from which the parent sent the contributions. Haag v. Barnes,
175 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1961); see also Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (Cal. 1953) (en
banc) (applying California law, regarding survival of tort actions, on the ground that "all of the
parties were residents of this state, and the estate of the deceased tortfeasor is being
administered in this state").
255. See, e.g., Jones v. R.S. Jones & Assocs., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 33, 33 (Va. 1993) (deciding a
conflict of law issue by listing not only the place of the accident, but also that the trip originated
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That judges write their opinions as though all these facts are relevant
indicates that judges think these other factors do contribute to the result. 256
Multifactor (e.g., balancing or weighing) approaches have several
positive characteristics. For a court that is hesitant, uncertain, or internally
divided about what reasoning to use, including as many factors as possible
increases confidence and builds consensus. Extra factors pointing toward
the chosen law-even ones that choice of law theorists dismiss as
irrelevant-make the choice to apply that law more convincing. The fact
that judges cannot reach a consensus without including all of these factors
underscores that, on these facts at least, courts are not comfortable with a
single-factor approach. 257 By including as many factors as possible, judges
build consensus for the chosen state's law, implicitly acknowledging that the
additional factors make the chosen law seem fairer and more reasonable.
Judges undoubtedly prefer multifactor approaches because of the
flexibility these approaches give them to reach results they find acceptable.
When there are a large number of connecting factors to consider, it is often
not possible to specify an objectively determinate formula. The solution may
be rebuttable presumptions such as the ones in the Restatement (Second) 258
or simply a loose verbal formulation such as center of gravity. 259 Flexibility is
important because it is flexibility, precisely, that is lacking with single-factor
theories. A rule that works well for a large percentage of cases will not
necessarily provide acceptable results for unique or idiosyncratic ones. A
single-factor method effectively ties a judge's hands by specifying the
particular contact that determines the choice of law issue-every case with
the same trigger factor must be treated the same.
in the state where the accident occurred, and that the decedent was flying the airplane in that
state).
256. Judges discuss supporting facts even in opinions that approvingly cite a single-factor
approach as being authoritative in their state, making the recitation of additional factors in
theory gratuitous. See, e.g., Risdon Enters., Inc. v. Colemill Enters., Inc., 324 S.E.2d 738, 739 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1984) (listing the parties' domiciles, the location of the accident, the primary place of
business of the defendant corporation, and the states over which the airplane frequently flew);
Hauch v. Connor, 453 A.2d 1207, 1208 (Md. 1983) (listing the parties' domiciles, location of
their employment, location of the accident, and location of the treatment facilities); Poole v.
Perkins, 101 S.E. 240, 241 (Va. 1919) (listing the parties' present and past domiciles and the
location where the note was signed and delivered, as well as the location where the note was to
be made payable).
257. See supra note 256 (giving examples of courts who cite a single-factor approach while,
at the same time, using multiple factors to reach a consensus).
258. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text (discussing the imposition of a single-
factor test in the Restatement (Second) that is framed as a rebuttable presumption in case a
competing factor has a more significant relationship).
259. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text (explaining the center-of-gravity
formulation which applies the law of the state with the most significant contacts).
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2. Critiques of Balancing
There are counterarguments, however. Balancing has its critics who
claim that balancing provides a judge with neither "objective criteria for
valuing or comparing the interests at stake" nor boundaries or restrictions
for the types of interests to be considered.260
Such arguments have not deterred judges from employing balancing as
a general matter, as a brief constitutional survey of balancing tests (below)
clearly shows.261 Moreover, the case for balancing is stronger in choice of law
than in other legal contexts. A multifactor balancing approach to choice of
law will not implicate the central academic concern with constitutional
balancing-that balancing "diminishes fundamental constitutional
principles." 262 In choice of law there are no comparable hierarchically
superior rights to be diluted.263
There are two related concerns, however, about multifactor approaches.
The first is that balancing, unlike a bright-line rule, does not allow the
parties to predict the applicable law-"balancing is inherently uncertain."264
The second is the danger of subjectivity in decision-making-imposition of
judges' personal preferences. 265 These concerns should be taken seriously.
Notably, there are specific areas of law where the importance of
predictability and uniformity have continued to dominate the choice of law
process even to this day. These include, most importantly, real property and
the internal affairs of corporations.266 In substantive areas such as these,
commitment to a single factor is far from arbitrary. For practical reasons, a
260. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 972
(1987).
261. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 10, at 249 (citing Michael Traynor, Conflict of Laws:
Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CAL. L. REV. 845 (1961)) (pointing out that
courts routinely balance competing interests when they make law in domestic cases).
262. Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 296 (1990); see also Paul W.
Kahn, The Court, the Community, and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence ofJnstice Powell, 97 YALE
L.J. 1, 4 (1987) (arguing that constitutional balancing is an unacceptable basis for judicial
review because it is "based ultimately on an intuition of justice, rather than an articulate
argument");Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 792 (2001). But
see Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 789, 794 (2007) (arguing
that constitutional balancing is an appropriate methodology in the United States because
"rights should be overridable, at least in part, for democratic reasons").
263. But c.f CURRIE, supra note 159, at 182 ("[A] ssessment of the respective values of the
competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states is a political function of a very high
order."); Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J.
171, 176 (arguing the same).
264. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 72 (1987).
265. See Allison H. Eid, Federalism and Formalism, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1191, 1194
(2003) ("The potential pitfall of any pragmatic balancing approach is that it may devolve simply
into an imposition of the judge's personal policy preferences.").
266. On the importance of the "situs" rule for real property, see generally Robert Ellickson,
A Private Idaho in Greenwich Village? 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 5 (2005), http://www.the
pocketpart.org/ylj-online/property-law/ 19-a-private-idaho-in-greenwich-village.
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single-factor test may be required. However, we do not believe that the
potential problems with balancing should be automatically and invariably
dispositive-in most areas of law, there are important countervailing
concerns.
First, by repudiating the first Restatement, state courts have already
decided that some uncertainty is preferable to an arbitrary, although
foreseeable, result. The first Restatement is generally recognized as the most
predictable of existing choice of law methods.267 This fact has not prevented
courts from using escape devices when necessary. 268 Courts that chose to use
escape devices made the decision aware of the likely loss of certainty and
predictability.269 Thus, since judges have already demonstrated a preference
for the likely loss of certainty and predictability over the arbitrary results
created by stand-alone triggers, such loss of certainty and predictability
cannot be blamed on multifactor approaches.
The problem of subjectivity, likewise, should be kept in perspective-a
single-factor test may fare no better at reaching a desirable outcome. Escape
devices undermine not only the first Restatement's claim to predictability
but also its claim to objectivity. Professor Symeon C. Symeonides observes
that "these rules remain in place only because the court is able to find a way
to evade them by using one of the traditional escapes, such as
characterization, substance versus procedure, renvoi, or, more often, the
[public policy] exception." 270 The need for predictability and objectivity is
undeniable, but choice of law may already have sacrificed those virtues. If, as
seems possible, a judge's personal preference is to apply the law of the state
with the most contacts to the case, then personal preference (if that is what
it is) is not necessarily a bad thing.
3. Balancing in Other Legal Contexts
Adopting a multifactor approach to choice of law would be consistent
with other substantive areas, such as constitutional law. Courts began
exploring the possibility of balancing the multiple interests at stake in civil-
267. For example, in the Montana transition case Phillips v. General Motors Corp., the court
noted that "certainty [and] predictability" are among the "practical advantages" of the first
Restatement's bright-line rules. Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2000 MT 55, 1 19, 298 Mont. 438,
19, 995 P.2d 1002, 1 19. However, those advantages are outweighed by the utility of "'a more
flexible approach which permits analysis of the policies and interests underlying the particular
issue before the court.'" Id. 22, 298 Mont. 22, 995 P.2d 22 (quoting In re Air Crash
Disaster at Boston, Mass. onJuly 31, 1971, 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 (D. Mass. 1975)).
268. Id. ] 19, 298 Mont. 9 19, 995 P.2d 19.
269. William M. Richman & David Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws on the Twenty-
Fifth Anniversary of Its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196,
1228 (1997) ("It is impossible to predict which issues will prompt a court to use the public
policy escape.").
270. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1998: Twelfth Annual
Survey, 47 AM.J. COmP. L. 327, 345 (1999).
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CHOICE OF LA W THEORY
rights cases in the 1960s. 271 By the 1980s, a tendency toward multifactor
balancing approaches to constitutional analysis had taken root.2 72 Over the
next three decades, courts used balancing to address competing interests in
numerous areas of constitutional law, ranging from First Amendment free-
speech concerns to Dormant Commerce Clause analyses and regulatory
takings. 273
In First Amendment free-speech cases, courts routinely balance factors
when determining whether a regulation of speech is content-neutral or
content-based; whether it is valid as a time, place, and manner regulation;
and whether the regulation serves a significant and legitimate state
interest.274 Courts balance private parties' interests against states' asserted
interests in regulating commercial speech, as in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.275 In Watchtower Bible & Tract
Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, the Supreme Court balanced a
religious organization's right to participate in door-to-door canvassing with a
community's interests in preventing fraud and crime and protecting
privacy. 276
Courts also frequently engage in multifactor balancing in criminal-
procedure cases. 277 The Supreme Court has broadly acknowledged that
"'the key principle of the Fourth Amendment is ... the balancing of
competing interests.' ' 278 The basic requirement that a policeman have
probable cause prior to effecting a stop or seizure balances "safeguard [ing]
citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from
unfounded charges of crime" against "enforcing the law in the community's
271. Coffin, supra note 253, at 18.
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1980) (balancing
a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern [with] the
extent of the burden imposed on the course of interstate commerce"' (quoting Raymond
Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978))); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (balancing the economic impact with the character of the
governmental action to determine whether a constitutional "taking" has occurred).
274. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 714-15 (2000) (balancing the state's interest in
"'protect[ing] the health and safety of ... citizens'" with the petitioners' First Amendment
interests (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996))).
275. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566-
71 (1980) (balancing the corporation's advertising rights against the commission's interest in
banning certain types of advertisements).
276. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 160-
64 (2002).
277. For an interesting overlap between First Amendment balancing and balancing in
constitutional criminal procedure, see Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), in
which the Supreme Court balances an attorney's right to free speech with the State of Nevada's
interest in fair trials.
278. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 219 (1979) (White,J., concurring)).
1171
HeinOnline -- 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1171 2009-2010
271 t r
ing l 272 r





r t- eutral r
;
t r t r l tion r i ifi t l iti te
i t r st.274 rt l ri t ti s' i t ts i t t t s' rted
i t ts i l ti i l , l tric
. lic o i i t
. l tt n,
r li i i ti 's i t t i ate r
' i i ting
.276
t r ing
re .277 t l
'''the key principle of the Fourth Amendment is ... the l i f
sts."'278 t t an
r a le s ri r t ff ti st r s i r l f r [i ]
iti le s
e s t 's
. ra , .
. ! .
. , . ., l . !. i t ays ., . . , ) i
"'a sensitive consideration f the eight a at re f t e state re lat ry r [ it ] t
t t te '" nd
t r r ., I . . i , . . , » ; t. . . .
, ) i i t r
tal ti r t tional ).
. , . ., . , ) 's
"' r tect[i ] t e ealth s f t f ... iti s'" it t titi rs' irst ent
i t r sts ( ti tr i , I . . r, . . , 6»).
. ee t. s s l . r . . . rvo ' f . ., . . , -
( ) ( l i t r r ti 's rti i ri t i t t i i 's i t t i
i t i t ti t ).
. t t r i l t ' . ., . . t , -
.
. r i t ti g l t t i
tit ti l i i l , V. , 1),
ic t e re e rt ala ces tt r 's ri t t fr it t t te f a's
i t r st i f ir tri ls.
. i i . , . . , . 81) .
. . , ) ] »).
I
f c o







t c l e l ced
- o i t
e t
y








See e asse s r r - ( ( l c ng
' o nd n u o h gu o conce n h he
t t f r i t r f i t r a r ti o
o o ansp nc v ce ( 8 ) e r s r
it , . . ( l t c i t it t e f
er e ac t t r i t sti t i rr
See e ill l r . . , - ( ( l i t t te i t r st i
'p o ng h h and a e y o c zen ' h he pe one ' F end
n e e quo ng ed on c nc v oh 518 S 470 475 (199
275 S en ud on a E ec o p v. Pub Se o 'n o 447 557 566
71 1980 ba anc ng he co po a on' adve s ng gh s aga ns he co ss on' n eres n
bann ng cer a n ypes f adver se en s
276. a ch o e b e rac Soc'y of . ., Inc. v. illage f trat on, 536 . . ,
64 (2002).
277. Fo an interestin overlap bet een First end en balancing a balancing i
constitutional cri inal procedure, see entile . State ar f evada, 501 . . 1030 (199 , i
whi h th Sup Cou t b l n an atto ney' ight to ee speech ith the Stat o evad '
inte e t in ai t ial .
278. ichigan v. Su ers, 452 .S. 692, 700 n.12 (19 ) (quoting una ay v. e ork,
442 .S. 200, 219 (1979) ( hite,]., concurring ).
95 IOWA LAWPREVIEW
protection." 279 In the Fifth Amendment context, the Supreme Court has
balanced government's interest in interrogation against the Court's
conviction that interrogation is inherently coercive. 280 In Baldwin v. New
York, the Supreme Court balanced protection afforded by a jury against the
need for speedy and efficient adjudication to determine the extent of the
Sixth Amendment constitutional right to ajury trial. 28 1
Wilkinson v. Austin underscores the continued relevance of balancing
for constitutional criminal-procedure cases. 282 In Wilkinson, a Fourteenth
Amendment case, the Court recognized an inmate's liberty interest in not
being assigned to a "Supermax," or highest security, prison.283 It balanced
an inmate's liberty interest against the "State's ... obligation ... to ensure
the safety of guards and prison personnel, the public, and the prisoners
themselves."284 In concluding that the state's interest is "dominant," the
Court showed no reluctance to engage in multifactor balancing.285
Balancing is also the dominant methodology in procedural-due-process
cases. For example, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court ruled that "an
evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability
benefits."286 In reaching this result, the Court balanced the following factors:
The private interest that will be affected by the official action
[with] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used [and] the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards [against] the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail. 287
The factors considered in Mathews v. Eldridge--private interests,
procedural concerns, and the state's interest-are similar to ones potentially
relevant to choice of law analysis.
4. Balancing: The Positive Case
Many prominent academics and judges speak highly of balancing as a
method for deciding complex issues. Frank Michelman, for example, wrote
that "[t]he balancing test, with its contextual focus, solicits future
conversation, by allowing for resolution of this case without predetermining
279. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
280. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986).
281. Baldwin v. NewYork, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970).
282. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
283. Id. at 224.
284. Id. at 227.
285. d.
286. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
287. Id. at 335.
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so many others that one 'side' experiences large-scale victory or defeat."2 88
Balancing has particular attractions, however, in the choice of law context.
At its most basic level, the argument in favor of multifactor approaches
is that scholars and judges cannot satisfactorily reduce choice of law disputes
to a single trigger factor, no matter how carefully the trigger is selected. 289
We posit two advantages potentially accompanying a multifactor approach
such as balancing: (1) minimization of extraterritoriality and (2) avoidance
of controversial jurisprudential assumptions.
As to the first, taking into account the number of contacts supporting a
particular state's law-as opposed to deciding on the basis of a single
factor-reflects the view that extraterritoriality is something to avoid. A
judge faced with a dispute having ten occurrences, persons, or items of
property in state A and one in state B will minimize extraterritoriality by
applying state A's law-multifactor theories provide the necessary flexibility
to do this. Every event that is located in the state whose law the court
ultimately applies is one more event that the law of the place where the
event occurred governs.
Single-factor approaches are not sensitive to the distribution of
connecting factors between the competing states. A state's law will apply if
the trigger factor points to the designated state, even if the trigger factor is
the only factor that does so. While it is thus guaranteed that the trigger
factor will only be subjected to the law of the place where it occurred, there
are no such assurances for any other events, persons, and property. Single-
factor approaches make no effort to select the applicable law to keep the
number of such events, persons, and property to a minimum. This would
require "contact counting," which both traditional and modern choice of
law theorists have uniformly rejected.290
It is not possible to eliminate entirely the extraterritorial application of
state law. In cases raising choice of law issues, there will always be contacts
pointing in different directions-if all contacts pointed toward the same
state the dispute would be purely domestic, and no choice of law issue would
arise. In mixed cases, the best that choice of law theorists can hope for is
reduction of extraterritoriality, not elimination. The question is not whether
there will be extraterritoriality, but how much.
Second, by counting, grouping, weighing, or balancing contacts, one
can reduce reliance on the contentious theorizing that plagues most choice
of law methods. In keeping with the intuition that the simplest theoretical
288. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,
100 HARv. L. REv. 4, 34 (1986).
289. See supra notes 77-82, 153-56, 190-208 and accompanying text (discussing different
theories for how to choose a potential single factor and highlighting the problems with the
theories).
290. See supra notes 9-28, 190-208 and accompanying text (analyzing the ways in which
choice of law theorists have come to realize the problems with single-factor approaches).
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explanation is typically the best, avoidance of metaphysical constructs like
vested rights or governmental interests has real attraction. Contact counting
may be intellectually low-tech, but in the present context, that is a
compliment.
Single-factor theories must have substantial theoretical bite to explain
why one connecting factor matters while all others are irrelevant. By
assuming the need to identify one connecting factor as uniquely relevant, a
single-factor theory takes upon itself the responsibility to differentiate
theoretically between the relevant contact and the others. Yet the source of
the premises underlying the choice is unclear. Do scholars and judges derive
the single factor from the law of one of the two states whose domestic laws
vie for application? If so, which one, and why-and doesn't such an
approach beg the important questions by presuming an answer to the choice
of law question as a threshold matter? If not, does some choice of law
"brooding omnipresence in the sky" compel the premises in question?
29 1
This would seem, after the decision of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, a rather
tenuous source to consult.292 Faced with both the need for theoretical "bite"
and the absence of any readily available positive law source, academics can
be forgiven for taking solace in higher-order constructs such as vested rights
or governmental interests. They have been charged with finding something
that simply has no tangible existence.
Multifactor approaches, in comparison, are theoretically minimalist. By
treating contacts as more or less fungible, they escape having to provide a
theoretical explanation for why one particular factor should matter so much
more than any of the others. Single-factor theories require an intellectual
commitment to a restrictive jurisprudential theory that can justify the choice
of one factor over another; multifactor theories do not.
V. CONCLUSION
Choice of law theory has long engaged in a fruitless search for a single
contact-the trigger-that is intrinsically indicative of whether a state has a
good claim to apply its own law. For the first Restatement, the trigger is the
last act-the place of injury in a tort case, for example-and for interest-
based analysis, the trigger is the domicile of the party who stands to benefit.
We are doubtful that this is a meaningful quest. Instead, applying a state's
law becomes appropriate because of the overall pattern of connections
between the dispute and the particular state.
291. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The common
law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or
quasi-sovereign that can be identified .... It always is the law of some State . .. ").
292. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938) ("We merely declare that in
applying the doctrine [that permitted the Court to disregard state common law] this Court and
the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to
the several States.").
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CHOICE OF LA W THEORY
Both traditional and modern choice of law theories have been
considerably weakened by their reliance on a single talismanic factor. Single-
factor theories are hard to maintain over extended periods of time because
they lend themselves to the easy creation of counterexamples. All one need
do is hypothesize a case in which the single dispositive contact-the
trigger-points to one state and all other contacts point toward another
state, particularly the forum. In such stand-alone trigger cases, courts have a
long history of ignoring the supposedly dispositive trigger and applying the
other state's law. The choice of law revolution of the mid-twentieth century
was a consequence of counterexamples such as these.
Perhaps most importantly, this impossible quest has led choice of law
theory into a dead end of meaningless conceptualism. Writers on the subject
have created metaphysical entities at a very high level of abstraction like
vested rights and governmental interests because there simply are not any
real differences between the designated trigger and the other factors in a
case. Weighing and balancing, in contrast, are conceptually more modest
because they do not require theorizing about the unique characteristics of
particular connecting factors.
Widespread adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
is the simplest way to solve the problem. Another alternative is developing a
weighing or balancing approach, perhaps under the center-of-gravity rubric,
a label with an established pedigree. Already, the Restatement (Second)'s
vague and amorphous most-significant-relationship test has found
considerable acceptance-even if that acceptance has largely been in
recognition of the minimal restrictions it imposes and maximal flexibility it
allows. In the meantime, at least, it is useful to consider that the mistakes the
first Restatement's drafters made are not so different from the ones its critics
made. Perhaps we can avoid making the same mistakes a third time.
1175
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APPENDIX
The following chart illustrates the breakdown of the transition cases,
identifying which states transitioned on a single-factor, lopsided fact pattern,
as opposed to a multifactor fact pattern. The chart also identifies states that
continue to use the first Restatement.
Single-Factor Transition' Multifactor First
Transition2  Restatement 3
Alaska Minnesota District of Columbia Alabama
Arizona Mississippi Hawaii Georgia
Arkansas Missouri New Mexico Kansas
California Montana Oregon Maryland
Colorado Nevada Utah North Carolina
Connecticut New Hampshire Vermont South Carolina
Delaware NewJersey Washington Virginia
Florida New York West Virginia









Total = 34 Total= 7 Total = 9
* Nebraska is not included; although Nebraska has adopted the Restatement
(Second), Nebraska jurisprudence does not include a clear transition case.4
1. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699, 703 (Alaska 1968) (rejecting /ex loci delicti when
all other factors pointed to Alaska); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 447 P.2d 254, 257 (Ariz. 1968) (en
banc) (rejecting the first Restatement and adopting the contacts theory when only the place of
the injury pointed to Arizona and all other factors pointed to New York); Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's
Pie Co., 550 S.W.2d 453, 456-58 (Ark. 1977) (en banc) (rejecting the first Restatement and
adopting the interest-analysis approach when only the place of the injury pointed to Missouri);
Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (Cal. 1953) (en banc) (applying the law of the forum
after determining that survival of a cause of action is procedural); First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 514
P.2d 314, 320 (Colo. 1973) (rejecting the first Restatement and adopting the most-significant-
relationship test when only the place of the injury (a plane crash) pointed to South Dakota and
all other factors pointed to Colorado); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 21-23 (Conn.
1986) (adopting the Restatement Second approach); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d
38, 47-48 (Del. 1991) (using the most-significant-relationship test); Bishop v. Fla. Specialty
Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980) (confining /ex/ oci delicti to only those cases where
there is no state with a more significant relationship); DeMeyer v. Maxwell, 647 P.2d 783, 785-
86 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting the first Restatement and adopting the Restatement
(Second) when only the place of the injury pointed to Oregon and all other factors pointed to
1176 (2010]
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CHOICE OF LAW THEORY
Idaho); Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593, 596 (I11. 1970) (rejecting lex loci delicti and adopting a
"most significant contacts" rule where only the place of the accident pointed to Iowa and all
other factors pointed to Illinois); Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ind.
1987) (applying Indiana law when only the place of the accident pointed to Illinois and all
other factors pointed to Indiana; continuing to preference the law of the place of the injury,
but if that state has an insignificant relationship to the action, applying the Restatement
(Second)); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831, 833-34 (Iowa 1968) (rejecting the first
Restatement and adopting the most-significant-relationship test in the context of a guest statute
when only the place of the injury pointed to Wisconsin and all other factors pointed to Iowa);
Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259, 260-61 (Ky. 1967) (rejecting lex loci delicti and adopting the
Restatement (Second) when only the place of the injury pointed to Indiana and all other
factors pointed to Kentucky); Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309, 312-13 (La. 1973)
(rejecting the first Restatement and adopting the Restatement (Second) when only the place of
the injury pointed to Mississippi and all other factors pointed to Louisiana); Beaulieu v.
Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610, 616-17 (Me. 1970) (rejecting lex loci delicti and adopting the
Restatement (Second) approach of applying the law of the common domicile in a guest-statute
action where both parties left from and planned to return to Maine); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 358
N.E.2d 416, 417-18 (Mass. 1976) (rejecting lex loci delicti and adopting interest analysis when
only the place of the injury pointed to New York and all other factors pointed to
Massachusetts); Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 843, 857 (Mich. 1982)
(considering two companion cases-Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. and Storie v. Southfield
Leasing, Inc.-that involved accidents where only the accident pointed to the application of
another state's law, but all other factors pointed to the application of Michigan law, and
deciding that lexfori should apply); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 82 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Minn.
1957) (applying Minnesota law "in conformity with principles of equity and justice" when all
factors except the place of the accident pointed to Minnesota); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d
509, 510 (Miss. 1968) (rejecting the law of the place of the injury in favor of "the most
substantial relationships of the parties and the dominant interest of the forum" when only the
place of the injury pointed to Louisiana and all other factors pointed to Mississippi); Kennedy v.
Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 184 (Mo. 1969) (en banc) (rejecting "the inflexible lex loci delicti rule in
favor" of the Restatement (Second) when only the place of the injury pointed to Indiana and all
other factors pointed to Missouri); Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2000 MT 55, 1 35, 298 Mont.
438, 1 35, 995 P.2d 1002, 35 (adopting the most-significant-relationship test when only the
place of injury pointed to Kansas and all other factors pointed to Montana); Gen. Motors Corp.
v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of the State of Nev., 134 P.3d 111, 116 (Nev. 2006) (en banc)
(adopting the most-significant-relationship test of the Restatement (Second)); Clark v. Clark,
222 A.2d 205, 207 (N.H. 1966) (rejecting lex loci delicti when only the place of the injury pointed
to Vermont and all other factors pointed to New Hampshire); Mellk v. Sarahson, 229 A.2d 625,
626-27 (N.J. 1967) (rejecting the lex loci delicti rule in favor of a state's-interest test when only
the place of the injury pointed to Ohio and all other factors pointed to New Jersey); Auten v.
Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102-03 (N.Y. 1954) (applying the "grouping contacts" theory); Issendorf
v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 755 (N.D. 1972) (rejecting the lex loci delicti rule in favor of the
significant-contacts test when only the place of the injury pointed to Minnesota and all other
factors pointed to North Dakota because "[t]he locus of the accident was fortuitous, having
resulted from a brief journey into Minnesota for food, beverage, and entertainment"); Fox v.
Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 267 N.E.2d 405, 407-08 (Ohio 1971) (adopting interest analysis
when only the place of the injury pointed to Illinois and all other factors pointed to Ohio);
Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632, 637-38 (Okla. 1974) (rejecting the lex loci delicti rule in favor
of the most-significant-relationship test when only the place of the injury pointed to Mexico and
all other factors pointed to Oklahoma); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 805-07
(Pa. 1964) (rejecting lex loci delicti and applying interest analysis when only the place of the
injury pointed to Colorado and all other factors pointed to Pennsylvania); Woodward v. Stewart,
243 A.2d 917, 923 (R.I. 1968) (rejecting the lex loci delicti rule in favor of the interest-weighing
approach when only the place of injury pointed to Massachusetts and all other factors pointed
1177
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to Rhode Island); Chambers v. Dakotah Charter, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 63, 67-68 (S.D. 1992)
(adopting the Restatement (Second) when only the place of the accident pointed to Missouri
and all other factors pointed to South Dakota); Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 59-60
(Tenn. 1992) (rejecting lex loci delicti and adopting the most-significant-relationship test when
only the place of the injury pointed to Arkansas and all other factors pointed to Tennessee);
Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318-19 (Tex. 1979) (applying the most-significant-
relationship test when only the place of the injury pointed to Mexico and all other factors
pointed to Texas); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408, 416-17 (Wis. 1965) (adopting the most-
significant-relationship test when only the place of the injury pointed to Nebraska and all other
factors pointed to Wisconsin).
2. Myers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577, 584 (D.C. 1967) (determining that the contacts in
Maryland were "fortuitous" and that those in the District of Columbia were "indeed superior to
those of any other jurisdiction" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Peters v. Peters, 634 P.2d
586, 664 (Haw. 1981) (rejecting lex loci delicti in favor of "an assessment of the interests and
policy factors involved"); Ferrell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2008-NMSC-042, 1 56, 144 N.M. 405, 188
P.3d 1156 ("We conclude that the Restatement (Second) is a more appropriate approach for
multi-state contract class actions."); Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'g Co., 428 P.2d 898, 905
(Or. 1967) (en banc) (applying the most-significant-relationship test); Forsman v. Forsman, 779
P.2d 218, 219-20 (Utah 1989) (following the Restatement (Second) approach and applying the
law of the domicile to an interspousal immunity claim); Amiot v. Ames, 693 A.2d 675, 677 (Vt.
1997) (deciding that choice-of-law decisions in tort actions "will be determined by which state
or country has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties");Johnson v.
Spider Staging Corp., 555 P.2d 997, 1000-01 (Wash. 1976) (en banc) (abandoning lex loci delicti
and applying the most-significant-relationship test).
3. Fitts v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 581 So. 2d 819, 823 (Ala. 1991) ("'Until it becomes
clear that a better rule exists, we will adhere to our traditional approach."' (quoting Gen. Tel.
Co. v. Trimm, 311 S.E.2d 460, 462 (Ga. 1984))); Risdon Enters., Inc. v. Colemill Enters., Inc.,
324 S.E.2d 738, 740 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (applying South Carolina law since the airplane crash
occurred there, and "[u]nder Georgia law, the lex loci delicti determines the substantive rights
of the parties"); Ling v. Jan's Liquors, 703 P.2d 731, 735 (Kan. 1985) (applying lex loci delicti
even when the injuries "were the result of a negligent act in another state"); Hauch v. Connor,
453 A.2d 1207, 1209 (Md. 1983) ("With regard to tort conflicts principles, we reject the position
of the Restatement [(Second)] and adhere to the rule that the substantive tort law of the state
where the wrong occurs governs."); Braxton v. Anco Elec., Inc., 409 S.E.2d 914, 915 (N.C. 1991)
(maintaining lex loci delicti for "tort law controlling the rights of the litigants," but ultimately
finding that North Carolina's workers' compensation law applied even though Virginia was the
place of the injury); Lister v. NationsBank of Delaware, N.A., 494 S.E.2d 449, 458 (S.C. Ct. App.
1997) ("We find traditional common law choice of law rules are still controlling in South
Carolina.");Jones v. R.S. Jones & Assocs., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 33, 34 (Va. 1993) ("[I]n this case, we
apply the substantive law of Florida, the place of the wrong, and the procedural law of
Virginia."); Paul v. Nat'l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 556 (W. Va. 1986) (reaffirming the "adherence to
the doctrine of lex loci delicti," but holding that for public-policy reasons "we will no longer
enforce the automobile guest passenger statutes of foreign jurisdictions in our courts"); Jack v.
Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 899 P.2d 891, 895 (Wyo. 1995) (applying Wyoming law since the
accident occurred in Wyoming).
4. See Crossley v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 251 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Neb. 1977) (noting that
the state "consistently held ... the law of the place where the accident occurred will be
applied," but then stating that "[u]nder virtually any rationale of the current principles of
conflict of laws ... the same result still follows").
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